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ABSTRACT
The Sunk Cost fallacy is a biased committed when individuals base their decisions
to stop or continue a course of action solely on past irrecoverable invested costs (i.e.,
monetary or time-related). Individuals’ susceptibility to the Sunk Cost fallacy has been
justified as the need to try to avoid appearing wasteful, to avoid appearing inconsistent, to
learn a lesson from and to punish self for a poorly made decision. A study by Bornstein
and Chapman (1995) evaluated these justifications along with a normative response and
found statistical differences among all justifications. However, the study of the Sunk
Cost fallacy and these justifications in health-related scenarios is scarce. The purpose of
the present study was to replicate Bornstein and Chapman’s study, develop and test new
health-related scenarios, and evaluate the relationship between the Sunk Cost fallacy
and individual differences in terms of decision making styles and fatalism. The replication
study yielded similar findings as the original study. Results across experiments confirmed
the presence of the Sunk Cost fallacy among a predominantly Mexican American sample
in both non-health related and health-related scenarios. There were statistically
significant associations between the Sunk Cost fallacy and decision making styles and
fatalism. In addition, there were statistical differences based on age and sex.
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INTRODUCTION

“When you have to make a choice and you don’t make it, that itself
is a choice”
William James

Making choices is part of our human nature: how long to stay in bed, what to eat
for breakfast, which job to choose. Yet, other living beings also make choices: where to
burrow, what food to gather, who to mate with. Furthermore, as in the above quote, even
not making a choice is in itself making a choice. Thus, it would be in our best interest to
try to select the best option or course of action, even if the selected course of action is
not to act.
Selecting a course of action, however, is not as simple as it may seem (Cheng, Li,
& Yu, 2005). Influential factors that can be explicit or implicit should be taken into account
when making a decision. For instance, explicit factors (i.e., salary) and implicit factors
(i.e., effort) are important considerations in staying at a job. It is of great importance to
identify the factors that have the greatest influence on the majority of people when
making decisions so that they make more informed decisions. Nonetheless, identifying
these factors can be complicated because there is variability in which factors are
considered important. In addition, there is variability in the way people use these factors,
which can be thought of as a variation of heuristic usage (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky,
1983; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).
Variation of heuristic usage may become apparent in some cases. For example,
two decision makers face the same question, use completely different decision making
1

styles, and yet, they both arrive at the same choice. Although these individual and
personal decision making styles may lead to good decisions, they can also lead to poor
decisions (Gibson, 2001; Riquelme, 2001).
The following scenario illustrates the way in which an individual may make a poor
decision. Imagine for a moment that a patient, who is obese and at risk of death, has
suffered from severe type II diabetes for the past two years. In addition, he knows that in
order to lower the risk of a heart attack, he has to control his diet and lose at least 30
pounds. However, he invested $500.00 dollars on a new wardrobe for work and he feels
that losing weight equates to losing the money he already invested. Thus, he continues
his unhealthy lifestyle and disregards his health problems. In this case, money seems to
be the explicit influencing factor behind his choice. Although there may be other implicit
influencing factors such as feeling too helpless about his poor health to care, the
influence of all these factors combined (i.e., money and helplessness) may cost this
patient his life.
If one was to assume that all factors in the previous scenario were carefully
considered, it would seem rational to choose life over $500.00 dollars. However, this
patient’s decision seems to be biased because he is only focusing on an irrecoverable
past investments instead of the future costs. The bias influencing the patient in this case
is known as the Sunk Cost fallacy (SCF, Arkes & Blumer, 1985). The SCF affects the way
individuals evaluate health and other decisions, eliciting in many cases negative and
damaging outcomes. Unfortunately, the case of this patient with type II diabetes is not an
improbable scenario. Even after careful planned responses to situations, humans tend to
change their behavior and how they view this situations when circumstances change but
2

they do not necessarily change their course of action (Bornstein & Chapman, 1995).
The influence of the SCF in decision makers’ choices is of great interest and it is
among a series of biases that have been extensively studied (Arkes & Blumer, 1985;
Arkes & Hutzel, 1999; Bornstein & Chapman, 1995; Garland, 1990; Garland & Newport,
1991; Tan & Yates, 1995; Thaler 1980; Schiltz, 2004). However, prior research does not
offer much insight into the impact of the SCF on scenarios related to health issues and
the effects of individual decision making styles on the SCF.
The objective of this dissertation was threefold. First, a replication of Bornstein
and Chapman (1995) study was conducted to examine the presence of the SCF in the
present population. Second, scenarios related to health issues were developed, and the
effects of the SCF on these scenarios were examined. Third, individual differences in the
presence of the SCF were evaluated. For all studies indicators such as age, ethnicity,
and sex were investigated. Significant findings may shed some light on how individual
differences and the SCF in health scenarios may affect the decision making process in
some people. These findings would be of help in suggesting further studies.

3

CHAPTER 1
BACKGROUND
1.1 The Sunk Cost Fallacy
1.1.1 Overview
In the hypothetical example presented in the introduction concerning the
reluctance to lose weight, the type II diabetes patient seemed to focus on past events
rather than on potential future benefits. He apparently focused on the amount of money
spent on his wardrobe, which is irrecoverable, instead of focusing on the immediate and
long term positive health benefits of losing weight when making this decision. This
patient’s behavior exemplifies the SCF. The SCF is a bias committed when a decision is
made to continue a project or choice based only on the past irrecoverable amount of time,
money, and/or effort (TME) already invested (Arkes & Blumer, 1985).
In other words, the TME invested are sunk and no longer variable; thus, they
should not influence future decisions. Based on classical economic theories, rational
decision makers should cut their losses when a course of action has no further benefit
and change their course of action in order to maximize the value of their future decisions
regardless of the extent of their losses (Moyer, 2004). Furthermore, the rational decision
maker should base choices on future benefits and incremental costs (Navarro, 2007).
Arkes and Blumer (1985, p.126) presented the following scenario to a group of college
students:
Assume that you have spent $100 on a ticket for a weekend ski trip to
Michigan. Several weeks later you buy a $50 ticket for a weekend ski trip to
Wisconsin. You think you will enjoy the Wisconsin ski trip more than the
4

Michigan ski trip. As you are putting your just-purchased Wisconsin ski trip
ticket in your wallet, you notice that the Michigan ski trip and the Wisconsin
ski trip are for the same weekend! It’s too late to sell either ticket, and you
cannot return either one. You must use one ticket and not the other. Which
ski trip will you go on?

When invested TME has been used and is irrecoverable, regardless of a
decisions future failure or success, TME should not influence someone to continue. In
the ski trips example, the amount of money spent cannot be recovered in any way; thus,
now becoming a sunk cost. Hence, the money spent for the ski trip should not affect any
future decisions, which in this case is the selection of the trip site. This means that all
participants in this experiment should have chosen the Wisconsin trip over the Michigan
trip (i.e., 100%). However, some decision makers (54.1%) chose the Michigan ski trip
instead because that ticket was more expensive than the one for the Wisconsin ski trip
(45.9%, 99% CI 30-62%).
The decision makers in the above example are focusing on past irrecoverable
costs in spite of the negative outcomes (i.e., going on a less enjoyable trip). However,
any future decisions should be based on incremental cost and future outcomes only
(Bazerman, Beekun, & Schoorman, 1982; Bowen, 1987). Thus, the rational decision
maker should choose the ski trip he enjoys (i.e., Wisconsin) because it would yield the
largest reward for what appears to be the most influential future factor. In other words,
the individual’s choices are: a) waste money or b) waste money and time (assuming that
spending time on an unpleasant activity is equivalent to time wasted). Theoretically, the
first choice should be more efficient1.
1

Most efficient and smaller waste: Waste Money < Largest waste: Waste Money + Waste Time

5

Further, let us consider the following example presented by Staw and Ross (1987,
p.68):
Last year you authorized the expenditure of $500,000 for what you thought
was a promising new project for the company. So far, the results have been
disappointing. The people running the project say that with an additional
$300,000 they can turn things around. Without extra funding, they cry,
there is little hope. Do you spend the extra money and risk further losses,
or do you cut off the project and accept the half-million-dollar write-off?
In the ski trip example, the decision maker has the choice to go on one of two trips.
He only needs to decide which one. He would show vulnerability to the SCF if he
chooses the trip solely based on cost. In Staw and Ross’ example, the decision maker
has two choices regarding the project: a) continue with the project or b) terminate the
project. In comparison to the ski trip, this new example consists of only one project (e.g.,
no two projects), thus all decisions are about this project. Staw and Ross’ example is a
variation of a situation that is vulnerable to the SCF, in which the rational choice,
according to some economists and psychologists (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Carpenter,
Matthews, & Brown, 2005; Garland, 1990), is to terminate the project as it is a waste of
more money. The loss of wasting money alone compared to wasting money and wasting
workers’ efforts2 could help a decision maker if he wanted to quantify losses instead of
sunk costs. Therefore the logical decision should be to terminate something that seems
to have no future. However, selecting the rational choice in cases like this is difficult for
most decision makers because sunk costs occur before witnessing a final product (Ware,
2

Here we would have to assume that in Staw and Ross’ (1987) example the work invested by workers on the project
is representative of sunken effort. However, this may also be considered as sunken time. Either way coupled with
sunken money remains the worse choice.
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1984). By not choosing the rational choice, the decision maker not only easily falls prey
to the SCF but also the commitment to a failing project or choice escalates3.
Researchers have speculated that this escalation may occur because individuals heavily
focus on sunk cost to the point they tend to forget why and how they generally evaluate
decisions (MacGregor & Lichtenstein, 1991).
The SCF can be a serious problem for decision makers, and ideally should be
eliminated because it may cause irrecoverable future losses. There are many complex
situations in the governmental, military, and business arenas in the United States in
which individuals might fall prey to the SCF as a consequence (Arkes & Blumer, 1985;
Whyte, 1990). Arkes and Blumer (1985) described an example of a political decision
affected by the SCF: the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway Project. Large sums of
money had been invested in this project but outcomes were not promising. In 1970, the
original estimate for the project was $323 million. In 1975, the estimate increased to
$815 million. By 1976 the estimate increased to $1.36 billion. Even at that point, its
proponents argued that discontinuing this project after spending large sums of money on
it would be wasting taxpayers’ money, a decision that reflected the SCF.
Another example of the SCF on a larger scale was the investment by France and
England’s governments in developing a supersonic jet named the Concorde (See Arkes
& Ayton, 1999). Even though there were not many interested buyers, both countries
continued to invest large amounts of TME. Nonetheless, the planes were not as efficient

3

The SCOFF is also known as the escalation of commitment fallacy (Beeler & Hunton, 1997; Brockner, 1992;
DeNicolis & Hantula, 1996; Staw, 1976, 1981; Whyte, 1986, 1990). However, the escalation of commitment fallacy
studies and the SCF have different methodologies. Generally, in escalation research different factors are tested
maintaining sunk costs invariable (Navarro, 2007), the current choice does not meet expectation or is failing (Moon,
2001) and negative information induces an escalation to commitment (Garland, 1990).
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as they had planned, their manufacture was very costly, and the price of usage was very
high. The project came to a halt when one Concord airplane crashed in 20004.
An interesting study of the SCF operating in the area of business was conducted
by Staw and Ha Hoang (1995). In this archival study, basketball teams were granted
more playing time and retained players for longer time on their roster based on their
salary and draft status (e.g., sunk money), rather than on the players’ court performance.
For every increment in the draft number there was a decrease in playing time of 23
minutes in the second year (β1 = -22.77, p < .01). Furthermore, if a player was chosen in
the second round instead of the first round of the draft, there was a decrease of 552
minutes of playing time during the player’s second year in the NBA, regardless of their
performance on the court. The more irrecoverable costs were sunk into a player the
more those players played.
Former President George W. Bush was heavily criticized for continuing to send
American troops to the war in Iraq based on the time, money, and effort invested. He
appeared to continue with this action regardless of the present outcomes (e.g., no
weapons of mass destruction had been found, the enemy had not surrendered) and
advice to terminate this project. He publicly stated that his reasoning was that large sums
of money had been spent and many soldiers had perished—a great example of the SCF
if based solely on this reasoning. It seems evident that the SCF could permeate all kinds
of decisions; and in spite of extensive research, the SCF continues to influence the
decisions of individuals. Thus, it is important to further study this bias. In order to do so,

4

Interestingly, this failure gave birth to the coined phrase Concorde fallacy, synonymous of the SCF, although this
term is more commonly used when lower animals are the ones who commit the SCF (Arkes & Ayton, 1999).
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several factors previously studied should be considered prior to proposing new and
possible influencing factors on the SCF, including existing modes of sunk costs, past
seminal experiments, theories of its existence, and prescriptions for controlling it.
1.1.2 Three Sunk Cost Dimensions
1.1.2.1Time
One dimension or type of sunk costs is time. However, there are few studies
formally exploring time as a sunk cost (Klaczynski & Cottrell, 2004). Navarro (2007)
conducted eight experiments examining the effects of time as a type of sunk cost.
Navarro (2007) found that the difference in the amount of time spent (e.g., short vs. long
amount of time) influences the extent of the SCF. In addition, Navarro (2007) also found
that the quality of time (e.g., tedious task vs. fun task) did not have a significant effect on
the SCF, which replicated earlier work (Soman, 2001).
1.1.2.2 Money
Most of the SCF research has concentrated on the importance of money as
dimension of sunk cost. Arkes (1996) presented participants with a hypothetical scenario
in which they were given two choices related to an obsolete income tax software
program: a) completely buying new software or b) renewing their previously bought
software. Only a small amount (11%) of the participants decided to purchase the new
program, even though the upgrade and the new program were the same price.
Participants indicated that they did not want to change programs because they had
already invested in one, ignoring the benefits of the new program. The difference
between buying a new program or keeping with the old one was statistically significant,
9

χ2(1) = 5.03, p < .05. Participants indicated they wanted to keep the software since they
had spent money on it. In another study, participants were asked to choose between
stopping or continuing building an airplane that was almost (90%) completed and money
had already been invested (Arkes & Hutzel, 1999). Even after being informed of the low
success rate of completion for the airplane, a statistically significant number of
participants chose to continue the course of action because of the amount of time that
had been already invested, t(144) = 1.97, p < .05. Overall, money seems to be the most
plausible sunk cost dimension to measure because its value remains constant across
participants (Carpenter et al., 1990; Staw & Ha Hoang, 1995).
1.1.2.3 Effort
Another sunk cost dimension is effort. Klaczynski and Cottrell (2004) presented
children aged 7 to 14 years old with scenarios dealing with effort as a dimension of sunk
cost. More children decided to continue (i.e., the SCF) than stop or switch with the
present course of action. In a more recent study, Navarro (2007), showed undergraduate
students scenarios that presented a leader of a copper-mining group in which the sunk
cost dimension of effort combined with time was defined as “zero-time” (i.e., mining
project would barely start), “time-easy” (i.e., mining ground has been easy to dig and
have spent 60 days working), and “time-hard” (i.e., mining ground has presented several
difficulties and have spent 60 days working). Scenarios specified that there would be
little reward in continuing with the present course of action. There was a statistical
difference among groups in terms of time, showing that both “time-easy” and “time-hard”
were selected above “zero-time”. However, there were no statistical differences in terms
of effort, though effort seemed to generate a change increasing the number of individuals
10

who decided to continue with the project when workers had put more effort in the mine
(47% “time-easy” and 75% “time-hard”).
Research on effort5 is more difficult to conduct because both are abstract, thus
making it harder to keep track of and measure these SCF dimensions (Staw & Fox, 1977;
Staw & Ross,1987). However, some studies found that the larger the amount of either
time, money or effort the more the vulnerability to the SCF was evident (Arkes & Blumer,
1985; Bornstein & Chapman, 1995; Garland, 1990; Garland & Newport, 1991). In light of
the methodological issues in including effort as a dimension in the SCF research, more
studies on the time and money comparisons could be conducted. It is important to
mention that other influencing factors in addition to from the sunk cost modes (i.e., TME)
need to be considered when examining the SCF.
1.1.3 Influencing Factors
Past research on the SCF is immense. Researchers have been searching for
explanations as to why the SCF occurs. In addition, they have explored possible factors
that influence the SCF. The following factors are of particular relevance to the present
dissertation: level of responsibility, manner in which the decision is made, and amount of
investment.
1.1.3.1 Level of Responsibility
The effect of level of responsibility of decision makers on their choices has been
unclear because there responsibility has been defined in different ways. Some

5

Conceptually, amount of effort invested at work, for instance, may vary depending on individual
differences. Two people may produce the same amount of work, but they may rate their effort lower or
higher than the other individual. Effort as a dimension was not used in the present dissertation because of
the issues in measuring it independently from extraneous variables.
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researchers have evaluated levels of responsibility by making decision makers
responsible for their own choices, while others have compared decision makers acting
alone or in a group. For instance, Whyte (1993) found that when decision makers were
made to believe that it was their responsibility if a project was failing, the decision makers
elicited more of the SCF. Similarly, other researchers have found that when participants
were held accountable for any negative consequences of their choices, decision makers
were more vulnerable to the SCF (Garland & Newport, 1991; Kanodia, Bushman, &
Dickhaut, 1989; Simonson & Nye, 1992; Staw 1976, 1981; Tetlock & Boettger, 1989).
However, some researchers have not found consistent significant differences in
comparisons between decisions made by an individual or decisions made by a group of
individuals (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Bazerman, Giuliano & Appelman, 1984). In those
studies, the group as a whole was held accountable instead of each individual group
member.
1.1.3.2 Decisions Care
Bornstein and Chapman (1995) argued that the degree to which a decision is
based on careful consideration or careless consideration (i.e., decision care) influenced
the SCF. They believed decision care was influential especially in situations in which the
decision maker is being observed or feels the need to learn a lesson from the current
course of action. Bornstein and Chapman also believed that when decisions are not
made carefully, decision makers feel that since resources have been invested the
situation should be used to learn a lesson so that the same mistake is not made in the
future. This becomes a SCF situation when the individual reaps no benefits by remaining
in the current course of action since learning a future lesson could be debatable.
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Bornstein and Chapman (1995) found that participants indeed felt strongly about
remaining in situations in which decisions were made carelessly, in particular when large
amounts of investments had been made.
1.1.3.3 Amount of Investment
Generally, the larger the sunk costs the more the SCF is elicited (Bornstein &
Chapman, 1995; Staw, 1981). In other words, the larger the investment amount, the
more likely an individual will continue with a course of action even if the odds are against
benefits. This positive linear relationship between the increase or decrease of money or
time as dimensions of sunk cost and the amount of the SCF elicited has been found
across scenarios. Bornstein and Chapman (1995) found that there were statistically
significant differences between scenarios in which large sums of money were invested
vs. small amounts, when an individual was trying to avoid appearing wasteful. In another
study, Navarro (2007) found that scenarios in which longer amounts of time were
invested produced a statistical higher preference than the scenarios in which shorter
amounts of time were invested.
Further scrutiny is needed of the array of statistically and non significant factors
influencing the SCF. For instance, level of responsibility, manner in which the decision is
made, and amount of investment should be further investigated. Aside from the SCF
modes (e.g., TME) and influencing factors, previous theories present some evidence that
may justify why the SCF occurs and should be considered.
1.1.4 Justifications for the Sunk Cost Fallacy
In addition to studying influencing factors, researchers have studied possible
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justifications or reasons for decision makers to commit the SCF. Past research has
shown that there are various possible causes for decision makers to commit the SCF:
fear of appearing inconsistent (Brockner, 1992; Staw, 1981; Staw & Ross, 1987), fear of
appearing wasteful (Arkes & Blumer, 1985), feeling personally responsible for lack of
success (Staw, 1976; Staw & Fox, 1977; Whyte, 1986), risk-seeking behavior after
considering losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Arkes & Hutzel, 1999; Garland &
Newport, 1991; Knox & Inkster, 1986; Thaler, 1980; Whyte, 1986; Whyte et al., 1997),
the need to learn a lesson or experience the decision as a punishment (Bornstein &
Chapman, 1995) and the perception of how scenarios and options are framed (Bornstein
& Chapman, 1995; Navarro 2007). Experiments conducted for this dissertation
concentrated on a) fear of appearing wasteful, b) fear of appearing inconsistent, c)
feeling the need to use the opportunity to learn a lesson, and d) the feeling of deserving a
punishment for current situation. A more detailed description of these explanations is
provided next.
1.1.4.1 Avoid Appearing Wasteful
Arkes and Blumer (1985) and other researchers argue that decision makers fall
prey to the SCF because they do not want to appear wasteful. Researchers feel that
decision makers have been constantly taught not to waste anything. For instance, some
parents nag their children to eat all of their food because there are others who do not
have food. Thus, researchers feel that such ideology in the decision maker’s mind is
stronger than being able to see future benefits (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1998). The
problem is not to avoid appearing wasteful but generalizing this rule to situations in which
the decision maker focuses on already sunk resources and the continuation of sinking
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further resources that could be used more efficiently elsewhere (See Bornstein &
Chapman, 1995). The following is an example of continuing a course of action to try to
avoid appearing wasteful (Arkes & Blumer, 1985):
On your way home you buy a TV dinner on sale for $3 at the local
grocery store. A few hours later you decide it is time for dinner, so you get
ready to put the TV dinner in the oven. Then you get an idea. You call up
your friend to ask if he would like to come over for a quick TV dinner and
then watch a good movie on TV. Your friend says “Sure.” So you go out to
buy a second TV dinner. However, all the on-sale TV dinners are gone. You
therefore have to spend $5 (the regular price) for the TV dinner identical to
the one you just bought for $3. You go home and put both dinners in the
oven. When the two dinners are fully cooked, you get a phone call. Your
friend is ill and cannot come. You are not hungry enough to eat both
dinners. You cannot freeze one. You must eat one and discard the other.
In this example, Arkes and Blumer (1985) expected all participants not to be
influenced by the SCF in terms of cost (i.e., $3 or $5 meal), since it is the exact same
product. However, results indicated that some (31.8 %) of the participants chose to eat
the $5 meal based on the fact of money invested. Although the majority chose the “no
preference response” (75.7%, 99% CI 64, 88%), the expectation was for all of the
participants (100%) to select the “no preference” choice. This choice seemed to be
influenced by the irrecoverable costs that were invested. In other words, participants
feared appearing wasteful.
1.1.4.2 Avoid Appearing Inconsistent
Some decision makers seem to fear appearing inconsistent (Brockner, 1992;
Staw, 1981; Staw & Ross, 1987). In other words, some decision makers feel that
changing courses of action or discontinuing a current project would represent accepting
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“failure.” Because decision makers seem to keep track of their failures rather than prior
successes, not continuing the course of action may imply that the decision maker is not
reliable because he is not consistent with his positive results. In addition, changing a
course of action may indicate an admission of having made a mistake (Bornstein &
Chapman, 1995).
This phenomenon seems to be stronger among cultures in which “saving face” is
prominent (Petrova, Cialdini, & Sills, 2007; Staw, 1981; Whyte, 1993). In addition, there
is a similar effect among leaders in positions of high power and among workers in which
their boss is constantly scrutinizing their work (Tan & Yates, 1995). Thus, avoiding
inconsistency seems to be influenced by the level of responsibility (Bornstein &
Chapman, 1995; Garland & Newport, 1991; Kanodia et al., 1989; Staw, 1976, 1981;
Simonson & Nye, 1992). The following is an example of continuing a course of action to
try to avoid appearing inconsistent regarding successes (Staw, 1981):
A company overestimates its capability to build an airplane brake
that will meet certain technical specifications at a given cost. Because it
wins the government contract, the company is forced to invest greater and
greater effort into meeting the contract terms. As a result of increasing
pressure to meet specifications and deadlines, records and tests of the
brake are misrepresented to government officials. Corporate careers and
company credibility are increasing staked to the airbrake contract, although
many in the firm know the brake will not work effectively. At the conclusion
of the construction period, the government test pilot flies the plane; it skids
off the runway and narrowly misses injuring the pilot.
In this example, the irrecoverable efforts, time and money consumed, seem to
play a key role in continuing with the project. Furthermore, decision makers feel that if
they continue the project, they may recover invested costs so they do not appear as
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inconsistent with their results (Staw, 1981). Adversely, decision makers continue to
invest more knowingly that they will not recover any of those costs. Some researchers
have suggested this is due to a cognitive dissonance.
1.1.4.3 Learn-a-lesson and Punishment
Bornstein and Chapman (1995) suggested two other possibilities for the presence
of the SCF: need to learn a lesson and punishment. Based on past research, Bornstein
and Chapman felt that individuals have different selves. In other words, individuals may
have a “judgmental self” that is overly critical of what they do. They may have also a
“teacher self” that tries to use all situations as teaching opportunities; or they may have a
“student self” that is constantly trying to learn.
Bornstein and Chapman (1995) presented different scenarios in which either an
adult alone or a parent and a child were together making a decision. Participants viewed
the decision made by the individual portrayed as a parent as an opportunity to teach a
lesson because although irrecoverable investments had been made, the parent could
take advantage of the situation. However, this becomes a SCF situation because costs
cannot be recovered even when the decision maker wants to learn a lesson from the
current situation. This is especially interesting when continuing with a course of action
regardless of level of enjoyment. Presumably, in terms of the SCF some decision makers
with a prominent “teacher self” would continue an unfruitful project to use the opportunity
to teach themselves not to replicate similar projects and decisions. Furthermore,
Bornstein and Chapman (1995) speculated that some decision makers might feel that
they should continue with the course of action as a punishment for not thinking carefully
before initiating similar projects or decisions. After presenting participants with various
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scenarios, Bornstein and Chapman (1995) found that in fact some situations caused
some decision makers to have a-need-for-punishment view, when making poor
decisions.
When studying the effects of the SCF on decisions, it is important to conduct more
research studies that compare different justifications to evaluate which ones have
stronger effects. Furthermore, it would be important to evaluate these justifications in
different scenarios such as scenarios that deal with health-related issues. Understanding
the justifications when making irrational decisions would help provide decision makers
with better messages to make more beneficial health-related decisions.
1.2 Health-related Decisions and the SCF
Beyond the fact that humans use different heuristics to make decisions on a daily
basis, the fact that there are different types of decisions is noteworthy. Thus, some
decisions may be more important and have a greater impact on the decision maker. This
would be true with decisions dealing at some extent with the decision maker’s health.
Furthermore, research has found that some of the same biases found in non-health
related decisions are found in health-related decisions (Arkes, Wortmann, Saville, &
Harkness, 1981; Bornstein, Emler, & Chapman, 1999; Chamot, Charvet, & Perneger,
2005). The SCF is not the exception.
It has been speculated that certain health behaviors are examples of the SCF. For
example, Arkes and Blumer (1985) found that participants consumed a food item based
on the price paid (i.e., amount of investment) and not merely for its contents. This
example alone may explore the reasons why individuals continue to consume large
amounts of products that are not beneficial (e.g., pizza, doughnuts, coke) for their future
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health. One possible reason for this damaging behavior could be that individuals are
consuming large amounts of products only based on their irrecoverable amount of
monetary value. However, no recovery would be made and instead, this biased thinking
may lead to an increase in existing health problems like diabetes and high cholesterol.
Notably, some researchers have argued that decision makers are more likely to
be susceptible to the SCF if a situation is framed in such a manner that continuing a
course of action, regardless of lacking future benefits, would seem the natural choice
(Bornstein & Chapman, 1995; Navarro 2007; Tan & Yates, 1995). Tan and Yates (1995)
suggested that the SCF could be reduced if decision makers are presented with
scenarios containing future benefits and outcomes. However, health-related decisions
may have more influencing variables than non-health related decisions (Bornstein et al.,
1999). Thus, prescribed solutions for the reduction of the SCF may not be as successful
in health-related decisions (Bornstein & Chapman, 1995). It would seem that when
non-health related decisions are in fact deemed unimportant, they would be less prone to
the SCF. However, health-related decisions may contain influential factors that may or
may not be evident. This will make difficult the evaluation of decision importance since
this may vary from individual to individual. For instance, Mckirnan, Ostrow, and Hope
(1996) found that HIV positive patients deemed their situation as trivial, thus changing
the framing of all their decisions.
O’Connor et al., (2003) noted that when dealing with health-related decisions, it is
difficult for individuals to differentiate complex health-related decisions and complex
health experiences. In complex health-related decisions, individuals tend to forget they
have a choice. Furthermore, health-related decisions vary in their complexity depending
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on an array of factors. In an example of a few of those factors, O’Connor et al., (2003)
found that decisions regarding institutionalization were harder, more confusing, and had
the highest decision delayed rate than health-related decisions associated with surgical
procedures.
There may be a relationship between the presence of the SCF and certain factors.
For instance, Whyte (1993) found that if participants felt truly responsible for a project’s
decisions, they were more vulnerable to the SCF. Similarly, Bornstein et al., (1999) found
that medical residents were more susceptible to the SCF only when they made a
decision as compared to when another person made the decision. However, these
participants did not fall prey to the SCF when the scenarios did not have to do with
medical situations. Nonetheless, the literature on the relationship between the SCF and
levels of responsibility is not definite and further research is needed. Another possible
effect of the SCF on health-related decisions would be in trying to avoid appearing
wasteful, thus deciding the continuation of an unhealthy behavior (Arkes & Blumer
1985).
On the other hand, the SCF could prove helpful (Bornstein & Chapman, 1995) in
maintaining healthy behaviors. Walton (2002) suggested that individuals might be more
committed to exercise if they made large investments (e.g., purchase of a treadmill).
There are not many studies that have explored the SCF influence in health scenarios,
although it seems noteworthy (Bornstein & Chapman, 1995; Bornstein et al., 1999;
Chapman & Sonnenberg, 2000). Bornstein et al., (1999) had medical residents make
decisions about health procedures on hypothetical patients (i.e., medical scenarios) by
manipulating amount of investment (i.e., high or low) and level of responsibility (i.e.,
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residents were making the decision or the residents were making the decision for a
hypothetical individual). Furthermore, medical residents made decisions dealing with
non-medical scenarios. Medical residents were more susceptible to the SCF when they
evaluated day-to-day decisions for a hypothetical individual than when the decision
maker was themselves. When evaluating medical decisions, medical residents were not
susceptible to the SCF either when they were making the decision or for some
hypothetical decision maker. The study also included non-medical residents (i.e.,
undergraduates) who did fall prey to the SCF more when they had to make the decisions.
It should be noted that Bornstein et al., (1999) only used the normative (i.e., stop or
switch course of action) and two SCF (i.e., continue with a course of action) responses
with the medical residents. The normative response is one that represents the logical
response expected by expert economists and judgment decision making researchers.
A way to improve individuals’ decisions would be to increase control over their
health-related decisions and this improvement could lead to desirable and attainable
health outcomes (Makoul, Arntson, & Schofield, 1995). If the SCF has an effect on
health-related decisions, it would be beneficial to evaluate this effect in an effort to
possibly reduce the SCF. However, there is a scarce amount of research that has
investigated the SCF in terms of health-related decisions (Chapman & Sonnenberg,
2000). One of the few studies conducted by Bornstein et al., (1999) compared medical
and non-medical scenarios among medical residents. However, only participants who
were medical residents dealt with medical scenarios. Thus, there are no other studies
that have evaluated the SCF in health scenarios formally among the general population.
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1.3 Individual Differences
The effects of individual differences on the SCF have been studied. Past research
has evaluated the relationship of the SCF and individual differences extensively in terms
of: Level of knowledge (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Carpenter et al., 2005), level of
responsibility (Kanodia et al., 1989; Staw, 1976, 1981), level of expertise (Simonson &
Nye, 1992; Tan & Yates, 1995) and age differences (Klaczynski, 2001; Strough, Mehta,
McFall, & Schullier, 2008). Other individual difference variables that may be related to
the SCF include one’s decision making styles and the perceived control people feel they
have over their decisions. These individual differences merit the attention of researchers
to further understand possible hidden underlying factors in the SCF effect (Klaczynski &
Cottrell, 2004). The present studies focused on individual differences in terms of: a)
decision making styles, and b) perceived control over decisions.
1.3.1 Decision Making Styles
Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1993) observed that individuals use many
decision making strategies, especially when decisions are complex. Furthermore,
researchers have noted that cognitive individual styles affect decisions’ outcome more
than previously considered (Hunt, Krzystofiak, Meindl, & Yousry, 1989; Messick, 1984;
Scott & Bruce, 1995; Spicer & Sadler-Smith, 2005). Some researchers have divided
cognitive styles into analytical and intuitive decision making styles (Allinson & Hayes,
1996; Andersson & Engelberg, 2006; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; Hunt,
Krzystofiak, Meindl, & Yousry, 1989; Kopfstein, 1973; Nygren, 2000; Nygren & White,
2002; Riding, 1997; Sadler-Smith, 1999). Individuals with an analytical cognitive style
make decisions through careful and methodical assessment of options, while those with
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an intuitive cognitive style tend to follow their “gut feeling” (Morera et al., 2006). Other
researchers have argued that cognitive styles may reflect regret-based styles, in which
individuals make decisions based on past experiences and feeling emotional regret
(Nygren & White, 2002). This dissertation is interested particularly in analytical, intuitive,
and regret-based decision making styles in relationship to the SCF.
1.3.1.1 Analytical and Intuitive Decision Making Styles
Past research has shown that decompositional decision making styles, in which
decision makers break down into pieces their decisions, tend to have a greater temporal
stability than intuitive decision making styles (Dawes, 1986; Fernandez, 2006; Meehl,
1954; Stillwell, Barron & Edwards, 1983). In other words, a course of action taken at one
point in time would be the same or at least similar at another point in time (i.e., temporally
stable) made with a decompositional or analytical decision making style. Furthermore,
several studies have shown that the convergent validity between intuitive or holistic and
analytical strategies is higher when the decision problem is not complex (Fernandez,
2006; Morera & Budescu, 1998; Ravinder, 1992; Von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986). As
the decision problem becomes more complex, the convergent validity of analytical and
intuitive judgments deteriorates, making these styles differ greatly from each other.
Butler and Harvey (1988) hypothesize that the intuitive decision making strategy may not
be as accurate because without a systematic decision style there is an overload of
information. Thus, the human mind may be unable to process that much information.
In past research, both decision making styles (i.e., analytical and intuitive) seem
to influence differently how people make decisions (Andersson & Engelberg, 2006).
Cheng, Li, and Yu, (2005) stated that individuals make decisions considering multiple
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criteria. Ideally, decision makers should consider and prefer the same criteria (e.g., if
quality is important, then the criteria of quality will be used in all decisions) but that is not
the case (Arkes, Schiltz, Kung, Bailey, & Gonzalez-Vallejo, 2000; Fernandez, 2006).
Arkes (2003) hypothesized that individuals use attributes in their decisions that are not
relevant (e.g., the color of a car instead of the price). Dawes (1986) believed that
decision makers prefer intuitive evaluations because of “illusory reasons” (e.g., personal
preference, overconfidence). Some researchers have observed that individuals with high
intuitive decision style scores were more likely to be impulsive (Andersson & Engelberg,
2006; Morera et al., 2006; Nygren, 2000).
Based on Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), intuitive decision
making styles may be related to risk-seeking styles, while analytical styles may be
related to risk adverse styles. For instance, Parker, Bruine de Bruin, and Fischhoff (2007)
found that self-reported maximizers (i.e., seekers of the highest possible gains), tend to
have high scores as spontaneous decision makers (i.e., intuitive decision making style).
Therefore, when a decision maker seeks to be a maximizer, he may insist on a current
project because he has the false belief that a big gain is coming after large losses (i.e.,
sunk costs). However, researchers found that maximizers were inferior decision makers
and tended to obtain negative outcomes (Thaler & Johnson, 1990). Therefore, if intuitive
decision making styles are related to higher SCF effects, decision makers may be
encouraged not to use such style.
On the other hand, it has been suggested that an intuitive decision maker may be
more flexible and adaptive to change (Nygren, 2000). Nygren (2000) conducted a study
in which participants were evaluated and rewarded according to their performance tasks,
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which were similar to the ones pilots complete in flights. Interestingly, the performance of
individuals with high analytical scores became relatively inferior across time, even after
additional practice. Furthermore, their performance in other tasks was never as effective
as the individuals with high intuitive scores by committing more mistakes. Seemingly,
when dealing with multiple tasks, analytical decision making styles may not be as useful.
Perhaps using an analytical decision style in a high attention-demand situation may be
detrimental to performance because decision makers have a sort of “tunneling kind of
effect” that interferes with maintaining a “global assessment” (Nygren & White, 2002).
This reasoning may explain why Carpenter et al., (2005) found a positive correlation
between committing the SCF and high mathematics SAT scores.
Although unlikely, Nygren (2000) adds that there is a difference between thinking
and decision style, which explains his results: analytical styles were predictive of inferior
performance. In other words, it may seem as if a decision maker can be an analytical
thinker that displays an intuitive decision making style. Intuitive decision making styles
may be beneficial when workload increases because they are more flexible to changes.
The flexible decision maker, who can adapt and switch from analytical to intuitive or vice
versa, is the one that has an advantage (Payne et al., 1993; Andersson & Engelberg,
2006; Nygren & White, 2002).
1.3.1.2 Regret-based Decision Making Style
Wong and Kwong (2007) noted that even when just thinking or imagining
situations that induce great commitment, individuals are flooded with an array of
emotions. These participants describe influencing emotions from past experiences and
emotions they expect to feel in the future after the decision has been made. Furthermore,
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those individuals who expect to feel more regret seem to gravitate toward greater
escalation in their commitments. On the other hand, Ku (2008) found that regret did not
predict escalation of commitment. Rather, participants over-predicted the amount of
regret over escalation of commitment. Furthermore, Ku (2008) found that participants
who escalated their commitment had little regret (d = .90). However, regret may focus the
decision maker on the past more than the future, giving more value to sunk costs and
increasing the susceptibility to the SCF.
1.3.1.3 Summary of Decision Styles
Differences in results of the presence and amount of the SCF may be due to
individual differences in decision styles when coupled with varied interpretations of
diverse situations. Furthermore, it is possible that the benefit of having a more adaptive
decision style is advantageous; perhaps such advantage would reduce some biases.
Thus, researchers would benefit from further understanding decision making processes
and biases to help individuals make decisions, taking into consideration individual
differences like decision making styles. However, past research has not offered decisive
insight into the relationship between individual decision making styles and the SCF.
1.3.2 Control over Decisions
In addition to the possible relationship between decision making styles and the
SCF, it is also important to consider individual differences in terms of how much control
individuals feel they have over their decisions and outcomes. In other words, individuals
may not change the course of their present fruitless situation because they may feel
guided by fate, luck, or divine powers (Benavides, Bonazzo, & Torres, 2006; Esparza &
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Wiebe, 2008; Mckirnan et al., 1996). For example:
Mr. Smith bought a house a year ago. But the neighborhood where the
house is located has become extremely dangerous because the crime rate
quadrupled within the past month. There are at least 3 to 4 burglaries per
night. However, Mr. Smith believes that he has no choice but to stay
because since he was meant to live there probably nothing will happen to
him and he has already spent money on the house.
As the previous example illustrates, Mr. Smith’s decision is guided by the amount
of resources (i.e., money) he has invested in the house and by some higher power (e.g.,
fate, destiny). Researchers have defined fatalism as the feelings an individual has
regarding of lack of control over decisions (Esparza & Wiebe, 2005; Futa, Hsu, &
Hansen, 2001; Ross, Mirowsky & Cockerham, 1983). Fatalism can be interpreted as the
belief that events are fixed in advance, that situations are helpless, that situations are
controlled externally, by luck or some divine power (Esparza & Wiebe 2005). Research
has shown that fatalism levels varied among individuals. For instance, Mckirnan et al.,
(1996) found that individuals with high fatalistic scores and were HIV positive experience
a similar effect to cognitive dissonance and a belief that their situation is due to destiny.
In the example, Mr. Smith has a fatalistic view in that he has no control over future
choices.
High levels of fatalism in terms of helplessness also correlate with low
self-efficacy and high levels of responsibility. Whyte et al., (1997) stated that decision
makers who had positive self-efficacy perceptions persisted for a longer time on their
present decision and spent greater amounts of effort on that decision. In addition, when
decision makers feel more personally responsible for decisions, they tend to stand by
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them even when these decisions are failing (Whyte, 1993). Presumably, higher fatalism
scores coupled with low levels of responsibility should yield high effects of the SCF.
Esparza and Wiebe (2008) found that depression and pessimism are positively
correlated with helplessness r(421) = .40, p < .01. Interestingly, Wong, Yik, and Kwong
(2006) found that negative affect (i.e., depression).produced a stronger commitment to a
present course of action. Similarly, Moon, Hollenbeck, Humphrey, and Maue (2003)
found that escalation of commitment was positively correlated to depression and anxiety.
On the other hand, Juliusson (2006) found that escalation of commitment was positively
correlated to optimism and negatively correlated to pessimism. In relationship to the SCF,
Ku (2008) found that participants’ predictions of feeling less entrapped tended to
escalate more in their commitments, r = -.61, p = .01. Presently there is no research that
examines fatalism and the SCF.
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CHAPTER 2
AIM OF DISSERTATION
According to experts in the area of decision making, an individual should not be
affected by irrecoverable sunk costs when deciding whether or not to continue with a
course of action that has no positive outcomes. Thus, the individual should change or
stop a course of action when a situation will not yield any type of future benefit (Arkes &
Blumer, 1985). However, a review of the Sunk Cost fallacy (SCF) literature suggests that
level of responsibility (i.e., decision made for oneself or hypothetical decision maker),
amount of sunk cost (i.e., a high vs. low investment), and manner in which a decision is
made (i.e., careful vs. carelessly) influence whether or not a decision maker would fall
prey to the SCF. Furthermore, research has shown that there may different justifications
or reasons why an individual is susceptible to the SCF such as fear of appearing
wasteful (Arkes & Blumer, 1985), wanting to learn a lesson from a situation (Bornstein &
Chapman, 1995), wanting to punish oneself for making a bad decision (Bornstein &
Chapman, 1995), or wanting to appear consistent across time (Staw, 1981). However,
published research has not investigated decision problems that are health-related.
Moreover, previous research has not studied the effects of individuals’ decision making
styles and individuals’ view of control over their decisions on the SCF.
2.1 Objective
Accordingly, the objective of this dissertation was threefold. First, a replication of
the study by Bornstein and Chapman (1995) was conducted to examine the presence of
the SCF in the present population. Second, scenarios related to health issues were
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developed, and the effects of the SCF on these scenarios were examined. Third, the
relationship of the SCF and individual differences was evaluated. For all studies
indicators such as age, ethnicity, and sex were investigated.
2.1.1 Replication Study
Replication studies have been suggested as a starting point for new research to
explore the generalizability of previous studies (Johnson, 2001; Reese, 1999). It is
believed that a replication of Bornstein and Chapman (1995) would provide support for
the role the effects of the SCF play on decisions on the basis of four reasons or
justifications: 1) Fear of appearing wasteful, 2) Need to learn a lesson, 3) Feel deserving
of punishment, and 4) Need to appear consistent. In addition, these four justifications
would be compared to the rational choice (i.e., normative).
Researchers have asked participants whether they would or would not follow a
course of action, by having them select one of two choices: a) stopping or switching the
course of action or b) continuing with the present course of action. According to
economists, stopping or switching a course of action in a situation with no future benefits
is the ideal rational choice (i.e., a normative response). Bornstein and Chapman (1995)
measured the SCF in a unique manner by using a 10-point Likert-like scale, which made
the analyses parametric. In this scale “1” represented “a very bad response, should
definitely not follow” and “10” represented “a very good response, should definitely
follow.” Participants were shown these verbal anchors only for the numbers “1” and “10.”
The rest of the numbers did not have any verbal anchors. Bornstein and Chapman
(1995) asked people to rate responses on this 10-point scale. Four different responses
or justifications represented how likely it would be that they would continue (i.e., the
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SCF) with a hypothetical course of action. One response or justification represented how
likely it would be that they would stop or switch a course of action. This would be the
response expected by expert economists.
Based on past theory, Bornstein and Chapman (1995) categorized justifications
for committing the SCF (i.e., continue with a failing course of action) into four responses:
1) Fear of appearing wasteful, 2) Need to learn a lesson, 3) Feel deserving of
punishment, and 4) Need to appear consistent. Furthermore, Bornstein and Chapman
added a fifth response that measures the lack of the SCF (i.e., normative response). The
normative response would represent the rational choice expected by expert economists.
They developed this list of justifications based on past experiments and literature
reviews. Bornstein and Chapman, then, tested the responses. Each scenario contained
an irrecoverable investment, a need to make a choice to continue or stop or switch the
course of action, and no seemingly future benefits. The following is an example from
Bornstein and Chapman (1995):

SCENARIO: Becky decides to take cello lessons. After Becky buys a cello
and pays $1200 for lessons for 3 months, Becky finds she is no longer
interested and wants to quit.
A. Becky should stop attending cello lessons because it would be a waste
of time and money to attend more lessons she won’t enjoy. (Normative
response).
B. Becky should continue with the cello lessons because otherwise she will
have wasted the time and money she has already spent. (Wasteful
response).
C. Becky should continue with the cello lessons to teach herself that next
time she should be more careful about what hobbies she selects for
herself. (Learn-a-lesson response).
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D. Becky should continue with the cello lessons because if she was foolish
enough to select a hobby that she doesn’t enjoy, she deserves to suffer by
continuing with the cello lessons. (Punishment response).
E. Becky should continue with the cello lessons because if she stops that
would mean she made a bad decision in deciding to take cello lessons. If it
was the right decision then, it is still the right decision. (Consistency
response).
Each participant rated all five responses (i.e., A, B, C, D, and E) on the 10 point
scale. Higher ratings on the response to the first question (i.e., A-normative response)
indicated a more rational or normative response to the scenario in which the decision
maker would stop or switch the course of action. Higher ratings on the next four
responses (i.e., B-wasteful, C-learn-a-lesson, D-punishment, and E-consistency)
indicated higher amounts of the SCF, in which the decision maker would continue with
the course of action. These last four responses give the researcher an opportunity to
further understand some possible underlying reasons for committing the SCF. Each
participant evaluated 8 scenarios (See APPENDIX A). Bornstein and Chapman (1995)
found that there was a statistical difference between the normative (i.e., stopping or
switching course of action) and the four SCF responses (i.e., continuing with the course
of action), indicating that the SCF was present (See Table 1). All responses were
statistically different from 1 and from each other. The normative response was not
reverse-coded. The normative response represents the expected answer by expert
economists. Although a little over 60% chose to stop a course of action, close to 40%
were susceptible to the SCF (i.e., wasteful, learn-a-lesson, consistency, and punishment
responses). Furthermore, from the SCF responses, the most common justification was
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the need to avoid appearing wasteful. As expected, the normative response was
negatively correlated to the other four responses representative of the SCF.

Table 1. Mean Ratings with Standard Deviations for Each Response (Adapted from Bornstein & Chapman,
1995, p. 256).

Response

M

SD

Normative

6.88**

3.14

Wasteful

4.76**

3.03

Learn-a-lesson

3.79**

2.84

Consistency

3.37**

2.57

Punishment

2.28**

2.06

Note. Ratings were made on a 10-point scale (“1” = “a very bad response, should definitely not follow” and
“10” = “a very good response, should definitely follow.”). Higher mean ratings indicate a higher agreement
with the response. Means with ** differ at p < .01.

In addition to exploring the five responses, Bornstein and Chapman (1995)
studied the effects of amount of investment, manner in which decision is made, and type
of decision maker on the SCF by manipulating them in each scenario. Amount of
investment was defined as utilizing a large or small (i.e., high, low) amount of resources
(i.e., time, money). The manner in which a decision was made consisted of the individual
in the scenario making a careful (“after careful consideration”) or a careless (“on the spur
of the moment”) decision. The decision maker was portrayed either as an adult-alone or
a parent and their child making a decision together.
The amount of investment explored the hypothesis that larger investments create
larger commitments to a course of action, regardless of its benefits. The variable manner
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in which a decision making evaluates the hypothesis that decisions made in a careless
manner will produce larger commitments to a course of action for the learn-a-lesson
response. The type of decision maker manipulated the levels of responsibility and tested
the hypothesis that the more responsible an individual feels, the larger the commitment
to a course of action. This manipulation and test occurs particularly in the learn-a-lesson
response.
Bornstein and Chapman (1995) found a main effect for amount of resources
invested, indicating that high amount of resources had the highest ratings. Moreover,

Table 2. Mean Response Ratings with Standard Deviations (Adapted from Bornstein & Chapman, 1995, p.
257).

Response

Variable

Normative

Wasteful

M

SD

M

SD

Learn-a-lesson
M

Consistency

Punishment

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Invested resources
High

6.50

3.24

5.12**

3.05

4.05**

2.92

3.55**

2.63

2.49**

2.28

Low

7.27**

2.98

4.39

2.96

3.52

2.73

3.20

2.51

2.07

1.79

6.28

3.25

4.86

3.09

4.56**

3.02

3.57**

2.73

2.61**

2.33

7.49**

2.89

4.66

2.96

3.01

2.40

3.16

2.39

1.94

1.68

Carefully

6.92

3.13

4.66

2.86

3.62

2.78

3.33

2.54

2.25

2.06

Carelessly

6.84

3.14

4.86

3.18

3.96*

2.89

3.40

2,61

2.31

2.06

Decision maker
Parent & child
Adult alone
Decision care

Note. Ratings were made on a 10-point scale (“1” = “a very bad response, should definitely not follow” and
“10” = “a very good response, should definitely follow.”). Higher mean ratings indicate a higher agreement
with the response. Means with **p < .05 or *p < .07 significantly differ within each condition.
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when the amount of resources invested was high, the wasteful response was selected as
more suitable to what the participant would have done. In addition, when decisions were
made by both parent and child, the learn-a-lesson response was rated highest than
when an adult alone made the decision. In the majority of instances, the punishment
response was rated the least. On Table 2, only the larger of the two variables compared
is being flagged (i.e., “*” or “**”) representing a statistical difference between those
variables (e.g., high and low for the normative response).
2.2 General Hypotheses
The overall goal of this dissertation was to examine the impact of individual
differences on the tendency to fall prey to the SCF especially when responding questions
to health-related scenarios. The individual differences that were studied regarding the
SCF are decision making styles and fatalism. The relationship between the SCF and the
individual differences as defined here has not been explored before.
The following are the general hypotheses for the present dissertation:
(1)

While the normative response will receive higher mean ratings than SCF
responses on average, a statistically significant number of participants will
endorse the SCF responses.

(2)

The normative response will be negatively correlated with the SCF responses.

(3)

Health-related scenarios (study 2) will yield higher SCF effects than non-health
related scenarios (study 1).
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CHAPTER 3
STUDY 1
Based on Bornstein and Chapman (1995), a replication experiment was
conducted with Introduction to Psychology students at the University of Texas at El Paso.
A replication study was conducted in order to examine the effects of a normative
response (i.e., stopping or switching a course of action) and four SCF responses (i.e.,
continuing with a course of action) on varied scenarios. These scenarios were based on
three variables: Whether (a) the decision maker was portrayed as a parent deciding with
a child or an adult acting alone, (b) the decision was made in a careful or carelessly
manner, and (c) the investments were large or small. In addition, individual differences
were defined as having three decision making styles (i.e., analytical, intuitive and
regret-based) and levels of fatalism (i.e., ineluctable destiny, helplessness, internality,
luck and divine control).
3.1 Hypotheses
The hypotheses for this study were:
(1)

SCF responses will be positively correlated with each other.

(2)

Scenarios in which there are large investments will have higher SCF ratings for
the wasteful, learn-a-lesson, punishment, and consistency responses.

(3)

Scenarios in which the decision maker is portrayed as a parent will have higher
SCF ratings for the learn-a-lesson, punishment, and consistency responses.

(4)

Scenarios in which the decision is made in careful manner will have lower SCF
ratings for the learn-a-lesson and punishment responses.
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(5)

The regret-based decision making style will be negatively correlated with the SCF
responses.

(6)

The analytical decision making style will positively correlate with the normative
response.

(7)

Fatalism will be positively correlated with the SCF responses.

3.2 Power Analyses
Prior to conducting this study, a power analysis was performed to determine
adequate sample size, assuming 64 conditions (8 sets X 8 scenarios). Using heuristic
values associated with “small,” “medium,” and “large” effect size estimates (See Cohen,
1988), it was conservatively assumed that the size of the effects of (a) the type of
decision maker (i.e., a parent deciding with a child or an adult acting alone), (b) manner
in which the decision was made (i.e., careful or carelessly), and (c) the amount of
investment (i.e., large or small) in the current study would be small. Using the G*POWER
program, (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), a power analysis of a repeated
measures within factors analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed. The analyses
indicated that a sample size of no larger than 128 participants would yield a small effect
size (f = .10), with an estimated power of .95 at the customary .05 level of statistical
significance.
3.3 Method
3.3.1 Participants
There were a total of 128 participants who, after completing a 1-hour session,
received 1 credit towards their Introduction to Psychology class requirement. Of the
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sample, over half (62.5%) were women, over half (61.3%) were freshman, and the mean
age was 19.93 (SD = 3.02). A little less than half (47.7%) of the participants spoke
English as their first language and the majority (83.8%) considered themselves Mexican
American. Table 3 shows the sample characteristics based on subjective questions that
relate to the Sunk Cost fallacy.

Table 3. Characteristics based on subjective questions for Study 1

Characteristic

N

(%)

Understand scenario conditions

97

(75.8)

Has been in a similar situation

97

(75.7)

Has watched an entire movie they dislike

109

(85.2)

Has continued a project they dislike

92

(71.9)

Has attended an event they dislike

119

(92.9)

Has belonged to a club/membership they do not use

121

(94.9)

Makes decisions based on who is watching

31

(24.2)

Makes decisions to teach others a lesson

85

(66.4)

Makes decisions based solely on past experiences

122

(95.3)

Makes decisions based on how much was invested

111

(86.7)

3.3.2 Measures
Prior to evaluating scenarios, all participants completed a questionnaire with
demographic questions. Participants also completed the Decision Making Styles
Inventory (DMI, Nygren, 2000), the Multidimensional Fatalism Measure (MFM, Esparza
& Wiebe, 2008), and the Marin Short Acculturation Scale (MSAS, Marin, Sabogal, Marin,
Otero-Sabogal, & Perez-Stable, 1987). After evaluating the scenarios, participants
identified whether they have participated in similar scenarios and what factors influenced
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them when making decisions. Measures can be found in the APPENDIX.
The Decision Making Styles Inventory (DMI, Nygren, 2000). The DMI is a 45-item
instrument developed to measure decision makers’ styles in terms of analytical, intuitive,
and regret modes of thinking. The item scores on all three subscales range from 1 to 6,
in which “1” represents strongly disagree and “6” strongly agree. Previously, the DMI has
shown high internal consistency (alpha = .88, .86, and .86 for the analytical, intuitive, and
regret subscales, respectively) and test-retest reliability (alphas = .82, .81, and .87 for
the analytical, intuitive, and regret subscales, respectively). The three subscales were
found to be orthogonal. In addition the DMI has shown good internal consistency among
UTEP students (alphas = .90, .83, and .82 for the analytical, intuitive, and regret
subscales, respectively in Morera et al., 2006).
The Multidimensional Fatalism Measure (MFM, Esparza & Wiebe, 2008). The
MFM consists of a 30-item fatalism measure on five factors: ineluctable destiny,
helplessness, internality, luck, and divine control. Each factor consists of six items on a
5-point Likert scale. This measure was found to be language (i.e., English and Spanish)
invariant. High scores on the ineluctable destiny (i.e., “I have learned that what is going
to happen will happen”), helplessness (i.e., “I feel that nothing I can do will change
things”), internality (i.e., “My life is determined by my own actions”), luck (i.e., “Some
people are simply born being lucky”), and divine control (i.e., “Everything that happens is
part of God’s plan”) indicate higher fatalistic tendencies. The MFM has shown strong
internal consistency for the 5 factors (Cronbach alpha = .76, .76, .80, .82, and .92
respectively in Esparza & Wiebe, 2008). Furthermore, the MFM has a good test-retest
reliabilities for all factors ranging from r(576) = .63 to .87.
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The Marin Short Acculturation Scale (MSAS, Marin et al., 1987). This
acculturation measure was developed originally for Latinos. As previously mentioned,
the MSAS is comprised of 12 questions and 3 subscales. The total MSAS score has an
internal consistency of .92. The first subscale consists of 5 items that measure
“Language use and ethnic loyalty” (alpha of .90). The second subscale consists of 3
items (alpha of .86) that measure “Media.” The third subscale consists of 4 items (alpha
of .78) that measure “Ethnic Social Relations.”
3.3.3 Design
In each session, participants gave ratings for a normative response (i.e., stop or
switch a course of action) and for each of the four SCF responses (i.e., continue a
course of action). An 8 (set) by 8 (scenario) Latin Square design was employed to control
for order effects. Within each condition a combination of three variables was manipulated:
Type of decision maker, manner in which the decision was made, and amount of
investment. First, mean comparisons were conducted to test the general hypothesis that
the normative response received higher ratings than the SCF responses. Second, a
correlation analysis of the normative and all the SCF response ratings was conducted to
test the general hypothesis that the normative response was measuring the opposite
effect of the SCF. Third, a 3 way repeated measures analysis of variance was conducted,
in which each response was treated as the dependent variable, to test the specific
hypotheses for this study. The three factors in the analysis of variance were type of
decision maker (i.e., portrayed as a parent or as an adult acting alone), manner in which
the decision was made (i.e., decision made after careful consideration or carelessly),
and amount of investment (i.e., large or small amounts of time and/or money).
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Covariates were added one at a time to the model to test their effect.
3.4 Procedure
After receiving Institutional Review Board approval, participants were recruited
from the Introduction to Psychology courses. Participants registered for the study using
the Experimetrix website. During the registration process, an explanation was provided
that indicated that the experiment would consist of rating different scenarios or situations.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the eight settings. Participants completed
a consent form. After consenting, participants completed the DMI, MFM, and MSAS
questionnaires. Finally, participants rated 8 scenarios on a 10-point scale on how
desirable they found the normative and each of the four SCF responses.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Five Responses
As in Bornstein and Chapman (1995), participants rated the quality of each of five
responses to the situation using a scale from 1 to 10 (i.e., “1” = a very bad response,
should definitely not follow to “10” = a very good response, should definitely follow).
Higher mean ratings indicate a higher agreement with the response. One response
corresponded to stopping or switching to another course of action (i.e., a rational choice
and the normative response), and four other responses involved continuing with a failed
course of action (i.e., SCF). The responses corresponding to continuing a course of
action were the wasteful, learn-a-lesson, punishment, and consistency responses. The
normative response across scenarios had higher mean ratings than the learn-a-lesson
response, t(127) = 6.36, p < .001, d = .16; the punishment response, t(127) = 11.06, p
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< .001, d = .39; and the consistency response, t(127) = 7.23, p < .001, d = .30. The
wasteful response across scenarios had higher mean ratings than the learn-a-lesson,
t(127) = 8.09, p < .001, d = .17; the punishment response, t(127) = 3.92, p < .001, d = .42;
and the consistency response, t(127) = 8.73, p < .001, d = .32. The learn-a-lesson
response across scenarios had higher mean ratings than the punishment response,
t(127) = 10.67, p < .001, d = .18; and the consistency response, t(127) = 2.53, p < .01, d
= .07. The consistency response had higher mean ratings than the punishment response,
t(127) = 6.18, p < .001, d = .12. Furthermore, all responses were statistically different
than “1” . See Table 4.
Furthermore, the normative response was statistically negatively correlated to the
wasteful response, r(126) = -.39, p = .000). Additionally, all the responses reflecting the
SCF (i.e., wasteful, learn-a lesson, punishment, and consistency responses) were

Table 4. Mean ratings for the five responses across scenarios for Study 1

Study 1
Response

M

SD

Normative

5.44**

1.44

Wasteful

5.32**

1.24

Learn-a-Lesson

4.25**

1.49

Punishment

3.16**

1.66

Consistency

3.89**

1.78

Note. Ratings were made on a 10-point scale (“1” = “a very bad response, should definitely not follow” and
“10” = “a very good response, should definitely follow.”). Means with ** differ at p < .01. Each mean rating is
a response to the 10-point scale. Higher mean ratings indicate a higher agreement with the response.
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statistically and positively correlated to each other, r(126) = .29 to .42, p < .001).
Analyses of the main effects and interactions of the five responses are reported
individually. In addition, the effects of decision making styles and fatalism covariates are
tested one at a time. These are reported below.
3.5.1.1 Normative Response
Ratings for the normative response were subjected to a 2 (investment amount) x 2
(manner of decision) x 2 (decision maker) repeated-measures ANOVA. There were no
statistical main effects or interactions involving amount of investment or manner in which
the decision was made. However, there was a statistically significant main effect due to
type of decision maker, F(1, 127) = 12.89, p = .000, partial η2 = .09. The average ratings
of type of decision maker were significantly higher in the adult-alone condition (M = 5.80,
SD = 1.78) than in the parent condition (M = 5.10, SD = 1.82).
In analyzing the covariates, these were entered one at a time into an analysis of
covariance (ANCOVA). The model included the three manipulated variables in the
design. Zero order correlations and significance of the covariates’ effects are reported for
each of the covariates in Table 5. This analysis showed that the Multidimensional
Fatalism Measure subscales Helplessness, F(1, 126) = 6.33, p = .01, partial η2 =.05; and
Internality, F(1, 126) = 7.31, p < .01, partial η2 = .01 were significantly related to the
normative response. Higher ratings for the normative response were positively
associated with higher Helplessness scores, while higher ratings for the normative
response were negatively associated with the Internality subscale. The regret-based
decision making style subscale was significantly related to the normative response, F(1,
126) = 6.65. p = .01, partial η2 = .05. Higher normative ratings were significantly
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associated with higher regret-based scores. No other subscales from the Decision
Making Style inventory were related to the normative response.
3.5.1.2 Wasteful Response
Ratings for the wasteful response were subjected to a 2 (investment amount) x 2
(manner of decision) x 2 (decision maker) repeated measures ANOVA. There was a

Table 5. Correlations of Responses and Covariates for Study 1

Response
Normative

Wasteful

Learn-a-lesson Punishment Consistency

-.02

-.04

-.10

-.07

1.

Analytical style

-.03

2.

Intuitive style

.01

.09

.19*

.16

3.

Regret-based style

.22*

-.05

-.01

-.02

4.

Ineluctable Destiny

.03

.24**

.33**

.29**

.13

5.

Helplessness

.22*

.07

.31**

.34**

.26**

6.

Internality

-.23**

.18*

-.07

-.12

-.04

7.

Luck

.11

.00

.23*

.23**

.21*

8.

Divine Control

.06

.12

.17

.16

.04

.19*
-.07

Note. *p < .05. **p < .01 (2-tailed).

statistically significant main effect due to amount of investment, F(1, 127) = 18.33, p
= .000,partial η2 = .13. The average ratings of the amount of investment were
significantly larger when there were high investments (M = 5.66, SD = 1.63) than when
there were low investments (M = 4.98, SD = 1.43). There was a statistically significant
main effect due to type of decision maker, F(1, 127) = 6.09, p < .05, partial η2 = .05. The
average ratings of type of decision maker were significantly higher in the parent condition
(M = 5.54, SD = 1.53) than in the adult-alone condition (M = 5.10, SD = 1.66).
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In the analyses of covariates, although the intuitive decision making style did not
have a Zero-order correlation with the wasteful response, entering this style as a
covariate made the interaction of decision type and decision maker significant, F(1, 126)
= 7.35, p = < .01, partial η2 = .03. In the covariates’ analyses, the Multidimensional
Fatalism Measure subscales Ineluctable Destiny, F(1, 126) = 7.55, p < .01, partial η2
= .06; and Internality, F(1, 126) = 4.23, p < .05, partial η2 = .03 were significantly related
to the wasteful response. Higher ratings for the wasteful response were positively
associated with higher Ineluctable Destiny scores and higher ratings for the wasteful
response were positively correlated to higher Internality scores.
3.5.1.3 Learn-a-Lesson Response
Ratings for the learn-a-lesson response were subjected to a 2 (investment
amount) x 2 (manner of decision) x 2 (decision maker) repeated-measures ANOVA.
There was a statistical significant main effect due to amount of investment, F(1, 127) =
4.19, p < .05, partial η2 = .03. The average ratings of the amount of investment were
significantly larger when there were high investments (M = 4.40, SD = 1.75) than when
there were low investments (M = 4.11, SD = 1.62). There was a statistically significant
main effect due to type of decision maker, F(1, 127) = 17.99, p = .000, partial η2 = .13.
The average ratings of type of decision maker were significantly higher in the parent
condition (M = 4.54, SD = 1.69) than in the adult-alone condition (M = 3.97, SD = 1.82).
Scores from the Intuition subscale of the Decision Making Styles inventory were
significantly related to the learn-a-lesson response, F(1, 126) = 4.58, p < .05, partial η2
= .04. Higher ratings for the learn-a-lesson response were positively associated with
higher intuitive scores. In the analyses of covariates, the Multidimensional Fatalism
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Measure subscales Ineluctable Destiny, F(1, 126) = 15.34, p = .000, partial η2 = .11;
Helplessness, F(1, 126) = 13.37, p = .000, partial η2 = .10; and Luck, F(1, 126) = 6.69, p
< .01, partial η2 = .05 were significantly related to the learn-a-lesson response. Higher
ratings for the learn-a-lesson response were positively associated with higher Ineluctable
Destiny scores, higher ratings for the wasteful response were positively correlated to
higher Helplessness scores, and higher ratings for the wasteful response were positively
correlated to higher Luck scores.
3.5.1.4 Punishment Response
Ratings for the punishment response were subjected to a 2 (investment amount)
X 2 (manner of decision) x 2 (decision maker) repeated-measures ANOVA. There was a
statistically significant main effect due to type of decision maker, F(1, 127) = 10.50, p
< .01, partial η2 = .08. The average ratings of type of decision maker were significantly
higher in the parent condition (M = 3.34, SD = 1.76) than in the adult-alone condition (M
= 2.98, SD = 1.78). There was an interaction between type of decision maker and
manner in which the decision was made, F(1, 127) = 4.83, p < .05, partial η2 = .04. The
ratings for the punishment response were higher when the decision maker was
portrayed as a parent who made careful decisions and when the decision maker was
portrayed as an adult acting alone, making a careless decision.
In the analyses of covariates, the Multidimensional Fatalism Measure subscales
Ineluctable Destiny, F(1, 126) = 11.27, p = .001, partial η2 = .08; Helplessness, F(1, 126)
= 16.87, p = .000, partial η2 = .12; and Luck, F(1, 126) = 7.10, p < .01, partial η2 = .05
were significantly related to the punishment response. Higher ratings for the punishment
response were positively associated with higher Ineluctable Destiny scores, higher
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ratings for the wasteful response were positively correlated to higher Helplessness
scores, and higher ratings for the wasteful response were positively correlated to higher
Luck scores.
3.5.1.5 Consistency Response
Ratings for the punishment response were subjected to a 2 (investment amount) x
2 (manner of decision) x 2 (decision maker) repeated-measures ANOVA. There were no
statistical findings for the main effects or interactions of levels of investment amount,
manner in which the decision was made or levels of type of decision maker.
In the analyses of covariates, the intuitive decision making style subscale was
significantly related to the consistency response, F(1, 126) = 4.75, p < .05, partial η2
= .04. Higher ratings in the consistency response significantly positively correlated with
higher ratings in the intuitive subscale. The Multidimensional Fatalism Measure
subscales Helplessness, F(1, 126) = 9.07, p < .01, partial η2 = .07; and Luck, F(1, 126) =
5.58, p < .05, partial η2 = .04 were significantly related to the consistency response.
Higher ratings for the consistency response were significantly positively associated with
higher Helplessness and Luck scores.
3.5.2 Subjective Questions and Other Variables
There were three significant differences in preference ratings for the SCF
responses that are important to mention: age, sex, participants’ understanding of the
evaluated scenarios, and desire to teach a lesson to others when making decisions.
They are described next.
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3.5.2.1 Age and Sex
Table 6 shows there were higher ratings for the learn-a-lesson response were
significantly negatively correlated to the increase in age of the participant. Higher ratings

Table 6. Correlations of Responses and Age for Study 1

Response
Normative Wasteful Learn-a-lesson Punishment Consistency
Age

-.06

-.07

-.20**

-.21**

-.16

Note. **p < .01 (2-tailed).

for the punishment response were significantly negatively correlated to the increase in
age of the participant.
There were statistical differences between men and women only for the
consistency response. Men gave higher preference ratings to the consistency response
than women. See table 7.

Table 7. Mean ratings across responses by Sex for Study 1

Response
Normative
M

SD

Waste

Learn-a-lesson

Punishment

Consistency

M

M

M

SD

M

SD

SD

SD

Males

5.57

1.42

5.32

1.32

4.37

1.42

3.44

1.74

4.27**

1.62

Females

5.34

1.45

5.32

1.78

4.15

1.55

2.93

1.57

3.57

1.86

Note. ** p < .01
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3.5.2.2 Evaluation of the Scenarios in Study 1
In addition, there were statistical differences in whether or not participants
understood the scenarios they were presented with and the preference ratings for the
punishment and the learn-a-lesson responses. Participants that indicated they
understood the scenarios had higher ratings for the learn-a-lesson and the punishment
response than those who indicated they did not understand the scenarios (See Table 8).
There were also statistically significant differences between those who indicated
making decisions to teach others and those who indicated not doing this. These
differences were found on the learn-a-lesson response and the punishment response.
Participants that indicated making decisions trying to teach others about decisions had
higher ratings for both responses than those who do not consider teaching others.

Table 8. Mean ratings across responses by subjective questions for Study 1

Response
Normative
M
Understand

SD

Waste
M

SD

Learn-a-lesson

Punishment

Consistency

M

M

M

SD

SD

SD

1

Yes

5.02

.85

5.46

.92

5.08*

1.50

4.08*

1.50

4.40

1.50

5.49

1.48

5.30

1.27

4.16

1.46

3.06

1.64

3.84

1.80

Yes

5.52

1.51

5.35

1.34

4.50**

1.42

3.39*

1.63

4.09

1.78

No

5.30

1.28

5.26

1.02

3.75

1.51

2.71

1.64

3.51

1.78

No
Teach others

2

1

2

Note. Participants were asked if they understood the scenarios they evaluated. Participants were asked
if generally they try to make decisions to teach others about making decisions. ** p < .01, * p < .05
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3.5.2.3 The DMI and the MFM
There were statistically significant correlations among the Decision Making Styles
Inventory (DMI) and the Multidimensional Fatalism Measure (MFM) as expressed on
Table 9. Within the DMI, there was a positive correlation between regret-based and

Table 9. Correlation Matrix of Decision Making Styles and Fatalism for Study 1

Subscale
1

2

1. Analytical style

1

2. Intuitive style

.05
**

3

.32

-.01

4. Ineluctable Destiny

-.07

.23

6. Internality
7. Luck
8. Divine Control

5

6

7

8

1

3. Regret-based style

5. Helplessness

4

*

1
**

1

*

.24

**

-.04

.02

.21

.49

1

.13

.03

.07

.01

-.31

*

.46

**

.21

-.07

.01

.17

.16

.12

.24

**

.21

.38

**

1

**

-.26

1

*

-.08

.10

**

1

Note. ** p < .01, * p < .05

analytical decision making styles. Among the MFM subscales, Ineluctable Destiny was
positively correlated with Helplessness, Luck, and Divine Control. Helplessness was
positively correlated with Luck and Divine Control. Lastly, between the DMI and the MFM,
regret-based decision making styles were positively correlated with Ineluctable Destiny,
Helplessness, and Divine Control.
3.5.2.4 Acculturation
Acculturation was measure using the MSM (Marin et al., 1987). Scores were
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obtained by adding the scores for each of the thee subscales. There were a total of 12
questions on a 5-point scale. The 5-items for the language/ethnicity loyalty subscale
indicated above average acculturation scores (M = 18, SD = 5.73). The 3-items for the
media subscale use indicated high acculturation scores (M = 13, SD = 5.70). The 4-items
for the ethnic social relations subscale indicated an acculturation among this sample
below average (M = 10.4, SD = 5.73). Acculturation had no statistically significant effects
on any variable.
3.6 Discussion
As expected, the normative response (i.e., stop or switch a course of action) was
the response most preferred and was negatively correlated with the wasteful response,
which represents a SCF effect. The normative response was not significantly correlated
with the other SCF responses (i.e., learn-a-lesson, punishment, or consistency).
However, all the SCF responses were significantly positively correlated with each other
indicating convergence. Similar to the results of Bornstein and Chapman (1995) the SCF
response with the highest mean ratings was the wasteful response. Interestingly, the
mean ratings for SCF responses in study 1 are larger with smaller standard deviations
than Bornstein and Chapman’s findings, while the normative response mean ratings are
smaller. . In addition, expert economists would expect the SCF responses to have an
average of “1”, which would indicate that participants were not susceptible to the SCF.
However, as seen in Table 4, all four SCF responses received preference rating statically
different than “1,” indicating that individuals in this sample were susceptible to the SCF
and that they decided to continue with a course of action even though it was not yielding
any benefits.
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As seen on the summary on Table 10, similar to Bornstein and Chapman’s (1995)
findings, preference ratings were higher for the waste and learn-a-lesson responses
when the amount of investment was large. However, the lack of statistical differences for

Table 10. Mean ratings across scenarios and responses for study 1

Response
Normative

Waste

Learn-a-lesson

Punishment

Consistency

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

High

5.34

1.72

5.66**

1.63

4.40*

1.75

3.18

1.75

3.98

1.95

Low

5.54

1.71

4.98

1.43

4.11

1.62

3.14

1.77

3.81

1.86

Parent and Child

5.10

1.82

5.54*

1.53

4.54**

1.69

3.34**

1.76

3.97

1.85

Adult Alone

5.80**

1.78

5.10

1.66

3.97

1.66

2.98

1.78

3.82

1.98

Carefully

5.44

1.59

5.42

1.51

4.32

1.60

3.21

1.69

3.89

1.86

Carelessly

5.45

1.72

5.20

1.48

4.18

1.66

3.11

1.76

3.89

1.84

Invested resources

Decision Maker

Decision Care

Note. ** p < .01, * p < .05

any of the consistency response conditions suggests that participants may not have
been preoccupied with appearing consistent on their decisions, which contradicts past
research findings (Staw, 1981; Staw & Ross, 1987). In addition, the lack of a statistical
difference across responses in terms of the manner in which a decision was made
suggests that participants did not consider whether decisions were made in a careful or
careless manner initially. However, there was a statistically significant interaction that
was not present in Bornstein and Chapman’s study, between type of decision maker and
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manner in which the decision was made for the punishment response (See Figure 1). In
this interaction, mean ratings for the punishment response in which higher when the
decision maker was portrayed as a parent and made the decision carefully than when
the decision maker was portrayed as an adult alone. This interaction indicates that
participants took into account the manner in which a decision was made initially only,
when
hen the decision maker was portrayed as a parent, but not when the decision maker
was portrayed as an adult making a decision alone.

Figure 1. Study 1. Estimated marginal means for the punishment response as a function of type of
decision maker and manner in which the decision was made.

The sample characteristics of participants in this study merit attention. There is a
possibility that ethnic background may have played a role in some of the significant
differences across studies.. However, in the present sample the majority (83.8%) were
Mexican American, which makes comparisons across groups difficult.
A relevant future study could evaluate different ethnic groups with large enough
samples. Another unique attribute in our sample was native language. More than half of
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the sample for this study spoke Spanish as their first language. A follow up study would
compare the effects across language to evaluate whether there are any significant
differences.
The unexpected effect of the regret-based decision making style on the normative
response seem to indicate that the more an individual makes decisions based on past
regrets, the more that individual is willing to leave a failing course of action. This may
relate to Whyte et al.,’s (1997) findings which suggested that decision makers who have
positive self-efficacy perceptions tend to remain in a course of action longer and continue
to invest greater amounts on a decision. As research has found, individuals with
regret-based decision making styles tend to make decisions based upon the
consequences of past decisions they regretted. Future studies may want to evaluate the
relationship between self-confidence and Sunk Cost effects. Another possible
explanation could be that individuals with regret-based decision making styles become
overwhelmed with an array of emotions (Wong & Kwong, 2007), thus quitting may seem
easier. In addition, this may explain the unexpected significant finding of the positive
correlation between the Helplessness subscale and the normative response since there
was a significant positive correlation between the regret-based decision making style
and the fatalism subscale Helplessness. Individuals may feel so helpless about a
present course of action that they feel better off quitting than continuing, which on the
surface may seem as a decision made by a rational individual but in reality is a decision
affected by individual differences (i.e., generally feeling helpless about decisions).
Furthermore, the effect of the intuitive decision making style on the consistency
response was also unexpected. The higher the scores on the intuitive subscale, the
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higher the mean ratings on the consistency response. This seems contradictory to past
research findings indicating that individuals with intuitive decision making styles make
decisions that are not consistent over time (Dawes, 1986; Meehl, 1954).
The significant positive correlations between fatalism subscales and the SCF
indicate that individuals in this sample feel they may have little control over making
decisions. This may contribute to their decision to stay in the present course of action,
regardless of its benefits.
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CHAPTER 4
PILOT STUDY FOR STUDY 2
Based on the results from study 1, a pilot study was conducted among
Introductory to Psychology students at the University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP). The
main goal of the pilot study was to develop scenarios with specific health-related topics
that were realistic to test the SCF effects.
4.1 Method
4.1.1 Subjects
Based on the population from which the data was collected for study 1 and the
purpose of any studies related to this dissertation, the focus population was college
students. The reason for choosing this population was to test developed health
scenarios for the first time with a controlled population. Research has shown individuals
deal with health issues differently than with non-health related issues (Boehm et al, 1993;
Escoffery et al., 2005). In addition, there are significant differences in how individuals
deal with health-related decisions and their age (Finucane et al., 2002; Strough et al.,
2008). The pilot study and subsequent dissertation studies will use only students from
Introduction to Psychology classes to try to control for sample differences. Findings from
studies in this dissertation could be compared to different populations.
The variable type of decision maker was changed based on the university
population statistics. The variable type of decision maker was defined for the new
scenarios as either “you” or some hypothetical person making the decision. This
replaced the decision maker portrayed as a parent or an adult in study 1. Participants
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were asked whether they make decisions differently based on the type of decision maker.
In order to create a pool of names for the hypothetical decision makers, participants were
asked to provide 3 common proper names for both males and females.
There were a total of 80 participants who, after completing a 1-hour session,
received 1 credit towards their Introduction to Psychology class requirement. Of the
sample, half (51.5%) were women, over half (60%) were freshman, and the mean age
was 20.24 (SD = 3.50).Less than half (40.7%) of the participants reported English was
their first language and the majority (75.3%) considered themselves Mexican American.
The majority (93.8%) reported being single, and reported (87.5%) not have any children.
4.1.2 Measures
First, participants filled out a demographic questionnaire. Then, they evaluated 20
scenarios. Finally, they completed a questionnaire relating to the scenarios.
4.1.2.1 Scenarios
Health scenarios were developed based on the health topics and issues most
relevant to a college population. Based on the literature regarding university students
(Collins, Carey, & Otto, 2009; Kiene, Tennen, & Armeli, 2008), health topics relating to
this population were narrowed down to five (i.e., eating habits, exercise, sex practices,
alcohol consumption, and smoking). Four scenarios were developed for each topic for a
grand total of 20 scenarios. The criteria for each scenario were to contain only one
continuous bad behavior (i.e., damaging health behavior), an irrecoverable sunk
investment (stated clearly in the scenario) in terms of money and time or money-alone by
the decision maker, and a point in which the decision maker had to choose between
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stopping or continuing a course of action. Additionally, participants were asked to
indicate the top 5 health issues related to university students.
The variable manner in which decisions were made and the amount of investment
were the same as in study 1. Thus, decisions were either made in a careful or in a
carless manner and investments were in large or small amounts. In terms of investments,
pilot study scenarios varied from low to high investments by a factor of 2.5. Participants
were invited to suggest alternative amounts of investments if scenario provided them
with an unrealistic amount. Furthermore, participants were asked to indicate how
plausible each scenario would be in terms of the manner in which the decision was made
(i.e., careful vs. carelessly). The following is an example of a scenario constructed for the
pilot study:
SCENARIO 1. (Martha vs. you) decides (after careful consideration
vs. on the spur of the moment) to go to an all-you can eat pizza
buffet that costs her ($7.99 vs. $19.98). After eating (1 plate of food
vs. 3 plates of food) (she vs. you) realizes (she vs. you) is full. But
(She vs. you) cannot take any food home.
4.1.3 Procedure
After receiving Institutional Review Board approval, participants were recruited
from the Introduction to Psychology courses. Participants were explained that the
purpose was to find scenarios that were realistic and clear about health-related issues
for college students. A definition of what a scenario is was provided to participants.
Participants evaluated all 20 scenarios. Scenarios were presented differently using a
Latin square design. This allowed participants to see different combinations of the three
variables of interest (i.e., decision maker, manner in which decision was made, and
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amount of investment). Participants were asked to circle any words or phrases that were
clear or confusing. They were encouraged to provide alternative words or phrases that
would make the scenarios clearer. At the end of each scenario, participants indicated if
the scenario was clear and realistic. At the end of the four scenarios pertaining to a
specific health topic (i.e., eating habits, sex practices, alcohol consumption, and
smoking), participants indicated an order of preference for scenarios from most realistic
and clear to the least. Scenarios were tested for clarity, realism, relevance and
plausibility. Participants were asked to indicate which scenarios were similar to situations
they had experienced. Participants were asked to indicate why they would or would not
continue with a scenario’s course of action. Participants were also asked to indicate if
there were factors in each scenario that they would not be able to recover. Finally,
participants were assured of the confidentiality of their answers. Each scenario packet
was placed by each participant in a box with an opening at the top. Consent forms were
collected separately in front of the participants.
4.2 Results
A total of 12.5% considered themselves regular smokers, 26.3% considered
themselves social smokers, 51.3% consumed alcohol, and 61.3% exercised on a regular
basis. A total of 56.3% reported they would make a decision differently depending on
who the decision maker is. Interestingly, the majority (78.8%) of the participants had
been in similar situations as those hypothesized on the scenarios. The health issues
related to college students participants named were: (1) 22.5 % drinking, (2) 12.5%
unsafe sex, (3) 11.3% smoking, (4) 8.8% eating healthier, (5) 7.5% exercise, and (6)
7.3% other issues.
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4.2.1 Criteria Selection of Final Health Scenarios
A total of eight scenarios were chosen (See APPENDIX). The scenarios with the
highest rating scores on plausibility, relevance, clarity, realism, and similarity were
chosen. There were some minor revisions implemented on the scenarios per participants’
suggestions, such as a word order change. For scenarios in which the decision maker
was some hypothetical person, the top four male and female names suggested by
participants were included. Table 11 (see APPENDIX) shows the percentage across
participants given to each scenario.
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CHAPTER 5
STUDY 2
One way to improve individuals’ health is to help them make better decisions
regarding their health (Makoul, Arntson, & Schofield, 1995). It is important to evaluate if
the SCF affects health-related decisions. If the SCF has an effect on health-related
decisions, it would be beneficial to evaluate this effect in an effort to possibly reduce the
SCF. There is one study that has evaluated health-related scenarios among medical
residents only (Bornstein et al., 1999). There is a need to have more studies evaluating
health-related scenarios (Chapman & Sonnenberg, 2000). While study 1 investigated the
SCF effects in a replication study, the primary purpose of this study was to investigate
the effects of the SCF in health-related scenarios and its association with individual
differences. This study used the eight scenarios developed and tested in the pilot study.
The eight scenarios included issues related to eating habits, exercise, sexual practices,
cigarette and alcohol consumption.
5.1 Hypotheses
Based on the results of study 1, the present study was developed. The hypotheses
for this study were:
(1)

SCF responses will be positively correlated with each other.

(2)

Scenarios in which there are large investments will have higher SCF ratings for
the wasteful, learn-a-lesson, punishment, and consistency responses.

(3)

Scenarios in which the decision maker is portrayed as “you” will have higher SCF
ratings for the learn-a-lesson, punishment, and consistency responses.
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(4)

Scenarios in which the decision is made in careful manner will have lower SCF
ratings for the learn-a-lesson and punishment responses.

(5)

The regret-based decision making style will be negatively correlated with the SCF
responses.

(6)

The analytical decision making style will positively correlate with the normative
response.

(7)

Fatalism will be positively correlated with the SCF responses.

5.2 Power Analyses
To determine adequate sample size for experiment 2, using heuristic values
associated with “small,” “medium,” and “large” effect size estimates (See Cohen, 1988
and Kittler, Menard, & Phillips, 2007), it was conservatively assumed that the size of the
effects of (a) the type of decision maker (i.e., a parent deciding with a child or an adult
acting alone), (b) manner in which the decision was made (i.e., careful or carelessly),
and (c) the amount of investment (i.e., large or small) in the current study would be small.
On the basis of effect sizes found in experiment 1 (d = .07 to .42; partial η2 = .03 to .13)
and following the same design assumptions as in experiment 1, the same sample size
was retained for experiment 2.
5.3 Method
5.3.1 Participants
There were a total of 128 participants who, after completing a 1-hour session,
received 1 credit towards their Introduction to Psychology class requirement. More than
half (66.4%) were women, the majority (87.5%) were single, one third (33.6%) were
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freshman, and the mean age was 21.99 (SD = 6.12). Less than half (44.5%) of the
participants spoke English as their first language, 71.9% had not taken any judgment
and decision making related classes, and the majority (83.8%) considered themselves
Mexican American. In terms of health-related issues, close to a fifth (18.8%) considered
themselves smokers, the average cigarettes smoked per week were 2.24 (SD = 1) and
per weekend were 5 (SD = 4). A little over half (68%) of the participants consumed 1 to 8
drinks per week and 1 to 12 drinks per weekend. From the sample, the majority (75.8%)
exercises on average 3.96 days a week (SD = 1.55). Table 11 shows the sample
characteristics based on subjective questions that relate to the SCF.

Table 11. Characteristics based on subjective questions for Study 2

N

(%)

Understand scenario conditions

123

(96.8)

Has been in a similar situation from at least 3 scenarios

115

(89.8)

Has consumed food even when stomach was full

119

(92.9)

Has opted out from exercising when invested in sedentary event

81

(63.3)

Has consumed an entire alcoholic beverage because of its costs

64

(50.0)

Has engaged in a sexual risky behavior due to time/money invested

43

(33.6)

Makes decisions based on who is watching

33

(25.8)

Makes decisions to teach others a lesson

88

(68.8)

Makes decisions based solely on past experiences

124

(96.9)

Makes decisions based on how much was invested

113

(88.3)

Characteristic

5.3.2 Measures
Prior to evaluating eight scenarios, all participants completed a questionnaire with
demographic questions. Participants also completed the Decision Making Styles
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Inventory (DMI, Nygren, 2000), the Multidimensional Fatalism Measure (MFM, Esparza
& Wiebe, 2008), and the Marin Short Acculturation Scale (MSAS, Marin et al., 1987).
After evaluating the scenarios, participants identified whether they have participated in
similar scenarios and what factors influenced them when making decisions.
Questionnaires and measures can be found in the APPENDIX. For a description of these
measures see the Measures section in Study 1.
5.3.3 Design
In each session, participants gave ratings for a normative response (i.e., stop or
switch a course of action) and for each of the four SCF responses (i.e., continue a
course of action). An 8 (set) by 8 (scenario) Latin Square design was employed to control
for order effects. Within each condition a combination of three variables was manipulated:
Type of decision maker, manner in which the decision was made, and amount of
investment. First, mean comparisons were conducted to test the general hypothesis that
the normative response received higher ratings than the SCF responses. Second, a
correlation analysis of the normative and all the SCF response ratings was conducted to
test the general hypothesis that the normative response was measuring the opposite
effect of the SCF. Third, a 3 way repeated measures analysis of variance was conducted,
in which each response was treated as the dependent variable, to test the specific
hypotheses for this study. The three factors in the analysis of variance were type of
decision maker (i.e., portrayed as “you” or as a hypothetical individual), manner in which
the decision was made (i.e., decision made after careful consideration or carelessly),
and amount of investment (i.e., large or small amounts of time and/or money).
Covariates were added one at a time to the model to test their effect.
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5.4 Procedure
After receiving Institutional Review Board approval, participants were recruited
from the Introduction to Psychology courses. Participants registered for the study using
the Experimetrix website. During the registration process, an explanation was provided
that indicated that the experiment would consist of rating different scenarios or situations.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the eight settings. Participants completed
a consent form. After consenting, participants completed the DMI, MFM, and MSAS
questionnaires. Finally, participants rated 8 scenarios on a 10-point scale on how
desirable they found the normative and each of the four SCF responses.
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Five Responses
As in Bornstein and Chapman (1995), participants rated the quality of each of five
responses to a total of 8 scenarios using a scale from 1 to 10 (i.e., 1 = a very bad
response, should definitely not follow to 10 = a very good response, should definitely
follow.). Higher mean ratings indicate a higher agreement with the response. One
response corresponded to stopping or switching to another course of action (i.e., a
rational choice and the normative response) and four other responses involved
continuing with a failed course of action (i.e., Sunk Cost fallacy). The responses
corresponding to continuing a course of action were the wasteful, learn-a-lesson,
punishment, and consistency responses. The normative response across scenarios had
higher mean ratings than the learn-a-lesson response, t(127) = 17.49, p < .001, d = .44;
the punishment response, t(127) = 20.82, p < .001, d = .44; and the consistency
response, t(127) = 18.02, p < .001, d = .48. The wasteful response across scenarios had
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higher mean ratings than the learn-a-lesson, t(127) = 8.89, p < .001, d = .12; the
punishment response, t(127) = 12.24, p < .001, d = .15; and the consistency response,
t(127) = 11.25, p < .001, d = .14. The learn-a-lesson response across scenarios had
higher mean ratings than the punishment response, t(127) = 7.29, p < .001, d = .05; and
the consistency response, t(127) = 2.30, p < .01, d = .02. The consistency response had
higher mean ratings than the punishment response, t(127) = -3.99, p < .001, d = -.04. All
responses are statistically different from “1”. The Normative response represents the
reverse-code of being susceptible to the SCF. In other words, the higher the normative
mean the lower the SCF mean (See Table 12). Furthermore, the normative response
was statistically negatively correlated to the wasteful response, learn-a-lesson response,
punishment response, and consistency response, r(126) = -.41 to -.65, p = .000.
Additionally, all the responses reflecting the Sunk Cost Fallacy (i.e., wasteful, learn-a

Table 12. Mean response ratings across scenarios, sets, and studies

Study 1

Study 2

Response

M

SD

M

SD

Normative

5.44**

1.44

6.86**

1.59

Wasteful

5.32**

1.24

3.93**

1.64

Learn-a-Lesson

4.25**

1.49

2.84**

1.41

Punishment

3.16**

1.66

2.35**

1.32

Consistency

3.89**

1.78

2.65**

1.43

Note. Ratings were made on a 10-point scale (“1” = “a very bad response, should definitely not follow” and
“10” = “a very good response, should definitely follow.”). Means with ** differ at p < .01. Each mean rating is
a response to the 10-point scale. Higher mean ratings indicate a higher agreement with the response.
These are the means across all 8 scenarios
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lesson, punishment, and consistency responses) were statistically positively correlated
to each other, r(126) = .53 to .85, p < .001. Analyses of the main effects and interactions
of the five responses are reported individually. In addition, the effects of decision making
styles and fatalism covariates are tested one at a time. These are reported below.
5.5.1.1 Normative Response
Ratings for the normative response were subjected to a 2 (investment amount) x 2
(manner of decision) x 2 (decision maker) repeated-measures ANOVA. There were no
statistical main effects or interactions involving amount of investment, type of decision
maker, or manner in which the decision was made.
In analyzing the covariates, these were entered one at a time into an ANCOVA.
The model included the three manipulated variables in the design. Zero order

Table 13. Correlations of Responses and Covariates for Study 2

Response
Subscale

Normative Wasteful Learn-a-lesson Punishment Consistency

1. Analytical style

.20*

-.09

-.09

-.15

-.19*

2. Intuitive style

.05

-.07

-.01

-.02

-.05

3. Regret-based style

.09

.14

-.04

-.03

-.09

4. Ineluctable Destiny

-.11

.19*

.20*

.23**

.26**

5. Helplessness

-.16

.17

.19*

.26**

.25**

.05

-.01

.13

.03

-.01

7. Luck

-.14

.16

.24**

.22**

.20*

8. Divine Control

-.03

.12

.06

.09

.12

6. Internality

Note. *p < .05. **p < .01 (2-tailed).
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correlations and significance of the covariates’ effects are reported for each of the
covariates. Table 13 shows the Zero order correlations. Results showed that Analytical
( subscale of the Decision Making Styles inventory) was significantly related to the
normative response, F(1, 126) = 5.09, p < .03, partial η2 = .04. Higher ratings on the
normative response were positively correlated with higher analytical scores.
5.5.1.2 Wasteful Response
Ratings for the wasteful response were subjected to a 2 (investment amount) x 2
(manner of decision) x 2 (decision maker) repeated measures ANOVA. There was a
statistically significant main effect due to amount of investment, F(1, 127) = 6.11, p < .01,
partial η2 = .05. The average ratings of the amount of investment were significantly larger
when there were high investments (M = 4.15, SD = 2.02) than when there were low
investments (M = 3.70, SD = 1.85).
In an analysis of covariance, the Multidimensional Fatalism Measure subscale
Ineluctable Destiny was significantly related to the wasteful response, F(1, 126) = 4.69, p
< .05, partial η2 = .04.
5.5.1.3 Learn-a-Lesson Response
Ratings for the learn-a-lesson response were subjected to a 2 (investment
amount) x 2 (manner of decision) x 2 (decision maker) repeated-measures ANOVA.
There were no statistical main effects or interactions involving amount of investment type
of decision maker, or manner in which the decision was made.
In the analyses of covariates, the Multidimensional Fatalism Measure subscales
Ineluctable Destiny, F(1, 126) = 5.11, p < .05, partial η2 = .04; Helplessness, F(1, 126) =
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4.84, p < .05, partial η2 = .04; and Luck, F(1, 126) = 7.88, p < .01, partial η2 = .06 were
significantly related to the learn-a-lesson response. Higher ratings for the learn-a-lesson
response were positively associated with higher Ineluctable Destiny scores, higher
Helplessness scores, and higher Luck scores. In addition, entering the covariate
Ineluctable Destiny made the main effect of type of decision maker significant, F(1, 126)
= 4.40, p < .05, partial η2 = .04. Decision maker was defined as “you” had higher ratings
than decision maker defined as a hypothetical individual. Also, the interaction between
manner in which a decision was made and amount of investment became significant, F(1,
126) = 5.05, p < .05, partial η2 = .04. Figure 2 shows that when there was a high
investment, careless decisions had higher learn-a-lesson response ratings.

Estimated Marginal Means

Learn-a-lesson Response

3.6
3.5
3.4
3.3
3.2
3.1
3
2.9
2.8
2.7
2.6
2.5

Careful
Careless

High

Low
Scenario

Figure 2. Study 2. Estimated marginal means for the learn-a-lesson response as a function of type of
decision maker and manner in which the decision was made.
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5.5.1.4 Punishment Response
Ratings for the punishment response were subjected to a 2 (investment amount)
X 2 (manner of decision) x 2 (decision maker) repeated-measures ANOVA. There was a
statistically significant main effect due to amount of investment, F(1, 127) = 5.43, p < .05,
partial η2 = .04. The average ratings of the amount of investment were significantly larger
when there were high investments (M = 2.47, SD = 1.50) than when there were low
investments (M = 2.22, SD = 1.41).
In the analyses of covariates, the Multidimensional Fatalism Measure subscales
Ineluctable Destiny, F(1, 126) = 6.84, p < .01, partial η2 = .05; Helplessness, (1, 126) =
8.85, p < .01, partial η2 = .07; and Luck, F(1, 126) = 6.28, p < .01, partial η2 = .05 were
significantly related to the punishment response. Higher ratings for the punishment

Estimated Marginal Means

Punishment Response

3
2.9
2.8
2.7
2.6
2.5
2.4
2.3
2.2
2.1
2

Careful

Careless

High

Low
Scenario

Figure 3. Study 2. Estimated marginal means for the punishment response as a function of type of
decision maker and manner in which the decision was made.
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response were positively associated with higher Ineluctable Destiny scores, higher
Helplessness scores, and higher Luck scores. In addition, entering the covariate
Helplessness made the interaction between manner in which a decision was made and
amount of investment significant, F(1, 126) = 5.05, p < .05, partial η2 = .04. Figure 3
shows that when there was a high investment, careful decisions had higher punishment
response ratings. But the opposite would take place when there were low investments.
5.5.1.5 Consistency Response
Ratings for the punishment response were subjected to a 2 (investment amount) x
2 (manner of decision) x 2 (decision maker) repeated-measures ANOVA. There were no
statistical findings for the main effects or interactions of levels of investment amount,
manner in which the decision was made or levels of type of decision maker.
In the analyses of covariates, results showed that Analytical (subscale of the
Decision Making Styles inventory) was significantly related to the consistency response,
F(1, 126) = 4.84, p < .05, partial η2 = .04. Higher ratings on the consistency response
were negatively correlated with higher analytical scores. In the analyses of covariates,
the Multidimensional Fatalism Measure subscales Ineluctable Destiny, F(1, 126) = 8.98,
p < .01, partial η2 = .07; Helplessness, F(1, 126) = 8.51, p < .01, partial η2 = .06; and
Luck, F(1, 126) = 5.16, p < .05, partial η2 = .04 were significantly related to the
consistency response. Higher ratings for the consistency response were positively
associated with higher Ineluctable Destiny scores, higher Helplessness scores, and
higher ratings Luck scores.
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5.5.2 Subjective Questions and Other Variables
5.5.2.1 Age and Sex
Higher ratings for the learn-a-lesson response were significantly negatively
correlated to the increase in age of the participant, F(1, 126) = 11.77, p < .01, partial η2
= .09. Higher ratings for the punishment response were significantly negatively
correlated to the increase in age of the participant, F(1, 126) = 8.78, p < .01, partial η2
= .07. Higher ratings for the consistency response were significantly negatively
correlated to the increase in age of the participant, F(1, 126) = 9.22, p < .01, partial η2
= .07. Table 14 shows the relationship of age with responses. In addition, there were
significant differences between males and females and the mean ratings for the

Table 14. Correlations of Responses and Age for Study 2

Response
Normative Wasteful Learn-a-lesson Punishment Consistency
Age

.11

-.12

-.29**

-.26**

-.26**

Note. **p < .01 (2-tailed).

normative, learn-a-lesson, punishment and consistency responses, as shown on Table
15. Overall, men gave higher ratings for the SCF responses than women. As expected
women gave higher ratings (M = 7.13, SD = 1.40) than the males (M = 6.30, SD = 1.81)
for the normative response.
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Table 15. Mean ratings across responses by Sex for Study 2

Response
Normative
M

SD

Waste
M

SD

Learn-a-lesson
M

SD

Punishment
M

SD

Consistency
M

SD

Males

6.30

1.81

4.25

1.84

3.31**

1.51

2.81**

1.39

3.27**

1.57

Females

7.13**

1.40

3.76

1.51

2.61

1.32

2.12

1.23

2.34

1.26

Note. ** p < .01. Only the highest group between the comparison is being flagged.

5.5.2.2 Evaluation of the Scenarios in Study 2
Participants were asked to rate on a 6-point scale on how strongly they agreed
with statements of how they evaluated the scenarios. Higher numbers indicated a higher
agreement with the statement. “I evaluated the scenarios based on how much money
was invested” received the highest rating (M = 4.28, SD = 1.11), followed by the
statements “I evaluated scenarios based on a combination of who the decision maker
was and how careful a decision was made” (M = 4.02, SD = 1.04) “I evaluated the
scenarios based on not wanting to waste anything that was already invested in the
scenario” (M = 3.77, SD = 1.24), and “I evaluated the scenarios based on how much
control I felt I had over the decision” (M = 3.77, SD = 1.28). Although, each scenario was
different, due to the complex design, the difference among scenarios was not tested.
Past research has found difference in scenarios (Bornstein & Chapman, 1999). However,
this difference is not generally the main interest.
5.5.2.3 The DMI and the MFM
There were statistically significant correlations between the Decision Making
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Styles and Multidimensional Fatalism Measure. The analytical decision making style is
statistically and positively correlated to the intuitive and regret based decision making
styles. See Table 16. The Ineluctable Destiny is significantly and positively related to
Helplessness, Luck, and Divine Control. Helplessness is statistically and negatively
associated with Internality. The analytical decision making style is significantly and
negatively correlated to Luck, while positively correlated with Internality. The
regret-based decision making styles is significantly and positively correlated to
Helplessness.

Table 16. Correlation Matrix of Decision Making Styles and Fatalism for Study 2

Subscale
1
1. Analytical style

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1

2. Intuitive style

.18*

1

3. Regret-based style

.42**

-.15

1
.02

1

.24**

.35**

4. Ineluctable Destiny

-.21*

.12

5. Helplessness

-.16

-.10

6. Internality

.33**

.16

.05

-.03

-.30**

1

7. Luck

-.33**

-.12

.03

.31**

.47**

-.09

1

8. Divine Control

-.11

-.06

.12

.49**

.16

-.09

.09.

1

1

Note. ** p < .01, * p < .05

5.5.2.4 Acculturation
The MSM (Marin et al., 1987) was obtained by adding the scores for each of the
thee subscales. The 5-items for the language/ethnicity loyalty subscale indicated above
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average acculturation scores (M = 18, SD = 5.30). The 3-items for the media subscale
use indicated high acculturation scores (M = 13, SD = 2.00). The 4-items for the ethnic
social relations subscale indicated an acculturation among this sample below average
(M = 10.4, SD = 2.00). Acculturation had no statistically significant effects on any
variable.
5.6 Discussion
The results showed that the normative response (i.e., switch or stop a current
course of action) was negatively correlated with the 4 SCF responses (i.e., continuing
with an unbeneficial course of action), as predicted. In addition, the 4 SCF responses
were positively correlated with each other, indicating convergence among these
responses. Similar to study 1, after the normative response, the waste response was
chosen first and the punishment response was chosen last. This indicates that in the
current sample, participants would commit the SCF more due to a fear of appearing
wasteful than any other SCF justification. Consistently, when participants were asked
what factors affected their decisions when evaluating the scenarios, fear of appearing
wasteful was one of the factors they selected most. In addition, it would be expected for
the SCF responses to have an average of “1”, which would indicate that participants are
not willing to continue with a course of action that is not yielding any benefits. However,
as seen in Table 12, all four SCF responses received preference rating statically different
than “1,” indicating individuals in this sample fell prey to the SCF.
As predicted, the amount of investment was significant for the wasteful,
learn-a-lesson, and punishment responses (see Table 17). However, the consistency
response had no significant effects due to amount of investment. The lack of this
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significant difference may indicate that participants were not preoccupied by the large or
small amounts of investments when trying to appear consistent. In addition, the lack of
any significant findings for the consistency response contradict past research findings
that level of responsibility in terms of who the decision maker is and manner in which the
decision is made (Bornstein & Chapman, 1995; Garland & Newport, 1991; Simonson &
Nye, 1992). The lack of a significant finding in the wasteful condition contradicts Arkes
and Blumer (1985) findings that when the decision maker is defined as “you” (e.g., the
participant of the study) there are higher SCF ratings.

Table 17. Mean ratings across scenarios and responses for Study 2

Response
Normative

Wasteful

Learn-a-lesson

Punishment

Consistency

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Decision Maker
You

6.74

1.88

3.98

1.74

2.95

1.57

2.39

1.36

2.60

1.45

Hypothetical

6.97

1.73

3.87

1.81

2.73

1.61

2.30

1.50

2.71

1.61

Carefully

6.84

1.77

4.03

2.04

2.87

1.51

2.35

1.52

2.63

1.49

Carelessly

6.87

2.09

3.83

1.97

2.82

1.69

2.35

1.43

2.67

1.70

High

6.81

1.93

4.15**

2.02

2.99*

1.77

2.47*

1.50

2.71

1.57

Low

6.90

1.88

3.70

1.85

2.69

1.48

2.22

1.40

2.58

1.60

Decision Care

Invested Resources

Note. ** p < .01, * p < .05

Interestingly, the interactions between amount of investment and manner in which
the decision was made were not significant for either the learn-a-lesson or the
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punishment responses. However, when the covariates Ineluctable Destiny and
Helplessness, were introduced in the model respectively within each response, these
interactions were significant. Similar to Bornstein and Chapman (1995), decisions with
large investments and made in a careless manner had higher SCF ratings for the
learn-a-lesson response. However the opposite situation was present when dealing with
the punishment response. This may indicate that participants believed that decisions
made in a careful manner with large investments deserved to serve as punishments for
the decision maker. However, the overall SCF ratings are still low, thus, caution must be
taken when making some generalizations.
The results indicated that there were significant differences in the way males and
females rated the normative and three of the SCF (i.e., learn-a-lesson, punishment, and
consistency) responses. In general, males prefer to continue with a course of action
more than women. Past research has shown that males and females adopt different
decision making strategies (Powell & Ansic, 1997). Females have a tendency to be less
risk seeking than males.
Findings in this study indicated that age had a strong influence on the SCF,
specifically on the learn-a-lesson, punishment and consistency responses. Strough et al
(2008) recently found that college students (M age = 19.47, SD = 1.36) were more likely
to be susceptible to the SCF than older adults (M age = 74.15, SD = 8.11). This
suggested that there was a negative linear relationship. Similarly, in this study there was
a significant negative correlation between age and responses.
The individual differences defined as decision making styles had an effect on the
SCF. As predicted, the analytical decision style was positively correlated with the
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normative response. This finding may support the idea that those who use an analytical
decision making styles make choices after careful consideration of all attributes (Morera
et al, 2006). Furthermore, Heath (1995) suggested that the SCF could be reduced by
paying cautious attention to what is being done.
Fatalism seems to be related to the SCF as seen in the results. The positive
significant correlations between Ineluctable Destiny and all the SCF responses may
indicate that individual differences are playing a role in decisions, aside from external
factors such as amount of investment, manner in which the decision is made and type of
decision maker. Results indicate that the more participants felt they are governed by
destiny, luck or felt helpless, the higher they rated the SCF responses. The fact that
participants indicated that they had evaluated scenarios based on amount of investment
and how much control they felt they had over decisions indicates that the SCF and
fatalism, although related to each other, are two different influences on decision makers.
Past research has shown that for some individuals, their decisions are affected by feeling
guided by fate (Benavides et al., 2006; Mckirnan et al., 1996).
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The objective of this dissertation was threefold. First, a replication of the study by
Bornstein and Chapman (1995) was conducted to examine the occurrence of the SCF in
the present population. Second, scenarios related to health issues were developed
based on the replication study and the effects of the SCF on these scenarios were
examined. Third, the relationship of the SCF and individual differences was evaluated.
For all studies, indicators such as age, ethnicity, and sex were investigated. The major
findings across studies are discussed next. The limitations encountered across studies
are explained. In addition, suggestions for future studies based on the findings across
studies are included.
6.1 Five Responses
Across studies, the normative response (i.e., stop or switch a course of action)
received the highest preference ratings. However, the SCF responses also received
preference ratings, indicating that some participants felt the best choice would be to
continue with a course of action, regardless of its lack of benefits. The significant positive
correlations among the SCF responses across studies indicate convergent validity in
measuring the same construct. These results indicate both studies were able to replicate
the presence of both the normative response and the SCF found in previous research
(Bornstein & Chapman, 1995). For the most part, the effect sizes of study 2 approximate
findings in study 1 and past findings, indicating a small to modest effect. . Based on
expert economists’ guides, an average of “1” should be expected, which would indicate
that participants are not willing to continue with a course of action that is not yielding any
79

benefits. However, in both studies, all mean preference ratings for the four SCF
responses were statistically different than “1,” indicating that individuals in this sample
were susceptible to the SCF.
Although the normative response was given the highest preference ratings, type
of decision maker was only significantly different in study 1. In all other scenarios, the
normative response had no statistical difference due to amount of investment, type of
decision maker, or decision care. This may indicate that across studies, individuals’
decision to stop or switch a course of action was not affected by these variables.
Furthermore, there were many conditions in which there was no main effect or
interaction of these three independent variables. It is possible that the variation within
these independent variables needs to be larger to find statistical effects.
6.2 Control Over Decisions
While the inclusion of the Multidimensional Fatalism Measure and the Decision
Making Styles inventory was exploratory, their association with the SCF is of interest.
Researchers have found that individual differences play an important role in day-to-day
changes in behavior (Kiene, Tennen, & Armeli, 2008). Fatalism was a factor
predominantly associated with the SCF across studies. Although this association was
predicted, future research needs to evaluate in more detail why a feeling of less control
over decisions is positively related to the SCF. For instance, fatalism has been
associated with lower levels of self-efficacy (Acevedo, 2005). However, some
researchers have found that decision makers who had positive self-efficacy perceptions
persisted for a longer time on their present course of action and spent greater amounts
of effort on that decision (Whyte, Saks, & Hook, 1997). A future study might measure
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levels of self-efficacy and evaluate the relationship of fatalism and the SCF.
6.3 Decision Making Styles
Decision making styles were defined as either analytical, intuitive, or regret based
(Nygren & White, 2002). Interestingly, there were differences on which style related to
the SCF, across studies. In study 1, the regret-based style was positively correlated with
the normative response, indicating that higher preference ratings for the rational choice
(i.e., stop a course of action) were associated with higher scores on this style. However,
when participants were dealing with health-related scenarios, the regret-based style
association disappeared. On the other hand, the analytical style was not present in
non-health related scenarios. However, the analytical style was positively correlated with
the normative response in health-related scenarios, indicating that the more individuals
tended to carefully analyze situations the more those individuals were willing to stop a
course of action. Nygren (2000) and Andersson and Engelberg (2006) observed that
individuals with high intuitive decision style scores were more likely to be impulsive. This
may suggest that when individuals are dealing with non-health related scenarios, they
may be more impulsive than when dealing with health-related scenarios. This merits
further evaluation because individual differences such as decision styles could be
considered to encourage decision makers to stop an unhealthy behavior.
6.4 Age Differences
The statistical negative correlation between the learn-a-lesson and punishment
responses in study 1 and the addition of the consistency response in study 2 is
noteworthy. Previous researchers have shown that the decision maker’s age could be an
influencing factor on the SCF (Arkes & Ayton, 1999; Klaczynski, 2001; Klaczynski &
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Cottrell, 2004; Strough et al., 2008). Arkes and Ayton (1999) suggested that children may
be less prone to the SCF than adults. Thus, it was thought that increased age was
predictive of the extent of the presence of the SCF (Brown, Asher, & Cialdini, 2005). The
idea of evaluating whether the SCF is or is not innate further grew with the evaluation of
the presence of the SCF (i.e., Concorde Fallacy) among certain animals such as wasps
(Dawkins & Brockmann, 1980) and pigeons (Navarro & Fantino, 2005). However,
Klaczynski (2001) found that although early adolescents (M age = 12.81, SD = .96 years)
and middle adolescents (M age = 16.77, SD = 1.96 years) do display the SCF, they do
not differ from each other nor do they differ from young adults (M age = 21.74, SD = .96).
Furthermore, Klaczynski and Cottrell (2004) found that the SCF slightly reduces as
children get older, but they are still susceptible to the SCF. However, Strough et al.,
(2008) recently found that college students (M age = 19.47, SD = 1.36) were more likely
to be susceptible to the SCF than older adults (M age = 74.15, SD = 8.11). In addition,
the older adults made more correct choices (i.e., normative choices), which suggest that
there may be a slight negative linear relationship between the SCF and age. Age is a
factor that needs to be further considered when conducting the SCF studies. A future
study would look further at age difference within college samples, by including not only
freshman but all other college populations.
6.5 Sex Differences
Although significant sex differences were present across studies, they must be
reviewed with caution. For instance, study 2 had a larger group of females than study 1.
However sex differences were present in both studies. Past research has found that
females tend to be less risk-seeking and adopt different strategies than males (Powell &
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Ansic, 1997). If this is the case, Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) has
explained individual choice on the basis of perception of gains and losses (value
function). Arkes and Blumer (1985) explained that decision makers initiate in point A
before making a choice. Once decision makers begin investing and accumulating
fruitless sunk costs, they move to point B. In point B, decision makers get the false
feeling that based on past investments that if they continue investing, a large gain will
soon occur. Based on Prospect theory, decision makers give larger values to losses than
to the value of obtaining a gain (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). However, the convex
shape of the value function in the domain of losses implies that continued losses will not
be viewed as more harmful. Furthermore, Powell and Ansic (1997) suggested that
females are generally less risk seeking. This hypothesis would explain why males gave
lower preference ratings to the normative response, while giving higher preference
ratings to the SCF responses.
6.6 Health-Related Behaviors
Since some researchers have found that the SCF will most likely be present and a
part of decisions (Ware, 1984), future studies may look at positive behaviors instead of
the damaging behaviors found in study 2. Studies could investigate if the SCF can be
used to maintain positive behaviors. Additionally, the length of the effect could be
measured. Beaton and Beaton (1995) suggested that commitment is a higher predictor
of loyalty than quality and value. For instance, the more a customer has spent shopping
in a specific store, the more likely that individual will continue to shop at that store. Future
studies might examine scenarios in which decision makers would be encouraged to
focus on sunk costs (e.g., time and effort spent on quitting smoking) to continue being
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loyal to a positive behavior (e.g., remain a non-smoker). However, as suggested by an
expert on the SCF, smoking may introduce other variables such as addiction. Also as
past research has found, decision makers cannot be presented with too many variables
because this will cause a decay in the decision making process (Arkes et al., 2000;
Fernandez, 2006; Morera et al., 2006). In addition, participants of this study could be
asked to have a detailed plan before making a decision, pay careful attention to the
decision and give careful consideration to expected future outcomes and benefits (Heath,
1995; Northcraft & Wolf, 1984; Tan & Yates, 1995).
6.7 Cultural Differences
There were peculiar findings in the samples that could be due to the
predominance of the Mexican American ethnicity. The replication study obtained higher
preference mean ratings than the original study for each of the justifications.
Furthermore, the SCF response that represented avoiding to appear wasteful was not
statistically different than the normative response, indicating that continuing with a
course of action (i.e., the SCF response) was deemed as important as stopping a course
of action (i.e., normative response). This confirms the findings of another study in which
a small sample of Latinos was included and they were more susceptible to the SCF
(Carpenter, Matthews, & Brown, 2005).
In addition, Hispanics have been considered a collectivistic culture (i.e., achieves
goals as a group) as opposed to an individualistic society (Hofstede, 1980). Interestingly,
in one study with Asians and non-Asian students, participants with higher collectivistic
scores were less willing to continue their participation when asked to complete a second
task that would make them appear more inconsistent with their decisions (Petrova,
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Cialdini, & Sills, 2007). However, the present studies did not use any scale that would
measure collectivistic and individualistic tendencies. Future studies should measure
these tendencies. These findings suggest there may be a relationship between culture
and the SCF (Keil et al., 2000). This relationship should be further investigated. However,
a sample that is less homogeneous in its sex, racial, and ethnic composition would be
desirable in order to allow for comparisons and generalizations.
6.8 Hypothetical Scenarios
Although both studies were conducted in the laboratory, Tan and Yates (1995)
found that participants evaluating hypothetical day-to-day scenarios elicited the SCF. Tan
and Yates (1995) indicated that familiarity with scenarios is an important component in
conducting hypothetical evaluations. In addition, subjective measures found that
participants have engaged in similar situations described in the hypothetical scenarios
(Bornstein & Chapman, 1995). Furthermore, Arkes and Blumer (1985) were able to
replicate laboratory findings in the real world. They randomized university ticket
purchasers into three conditions: regular price or two discount conditions. Notably, those
who paid the full price (i.e., invested more money) attended more events than the
discounted ticket purchasers, and this difference was statistically significant. Therefore,
the SCF can be tested in either the laboratory or real life situations. However, in terms of
the health-related scenarios, real life situations would be more preferable. In study 2, all
responses were self-reported. Future studies could have an apparatus to measure how
much a participant really smokes on a daily basis or a scale to measure weight. Such
studies could further explore the effects of individual differences and the susceptibility to
the SCF in terms of specific groups (e.g., smokers).
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6.9 Uncertainty in Decisions
Future studies would ask if the specific scenarios being evaluated cause the
participant to feel overwhelmed, thus causing the decision maker to stop a course of
action. These kinds of studies would evaluate if stopping or switching a course of action
is being done as a rational choice or because the decision maker is overwhelmed. In
addition, participants could be asked if there are aspects of the decision that feel
uncertain. Furthermore, future studies might try to identify them. O’Conner et al., (2003)
also found that uncertainty caused decisional conflict among women. Also another
question that evaluates how much an individual understands the scenarios should be
added. Research has shown that unclear expenses may cause decision makers to give
up a project too early when in fact the future benefits were promising (Bragger, Bragger,
Hantula, & Kiman, 1998; Curhan & Pentland, 2007).
6.10 Experimental Design
In terms of the designs used across studies, there are suggestions for future
studies. Specific designs should be chosen to allow comparisons for each scenario in
terms of the specific situation presented. Furthermore, these designs should allow the
comparison of hypothetical scenarios and real life situations. Also, if the 10-point scale is
used in the future, verbal anchors should be considered for each of the numbers, not
only for 1” and “10.” Furthermore, there may be populations who may need shorter
scales or other types of scales. For instance, some Mexican American samples have
had a difficulty with Likert type scales (Korzenny, & Korzenny, 2005).
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
These studies have provided evidence of the presence of the SCF in a
predominantly Mexican American population in both non-health related and
health-related scenarios. This study adds to the literature because previous research
had not defined individual differences in terms of decision making styles and perceived
control over decisions. Replications of the second study should be conducted with less
homogenous groups. A more extensive study of health-related decisions vulnerable to
the SCF is needed. Particular focus should be given to adding different factors one at a
time to be able to discern if the SCF is still the primary influencing factor. Finally, it is
important to consider that when an individual stays on a course of action, even in an
attempt to not make a choice, he is making a choice. As William James said it, not
making a choice is a choice in itself.
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APPENDIX A: SUNK COST SCENARIOS FOR STUDY 1
Replication of Bornstein and Chapman (1995) Experiment
Scenarios
1. Becky decides to take cello lessons. After Becky buys a cello and pays for lessons
($1200 for 3 months vs. $140 for 1 month), Becky finds she is no longer interested and
wants to quit.
2. Edith selects a video to rent. After Edith pays for it and she watches the beginning ($4
for 45 min vs. $99 for 10 min), Edith realizes she is not enjoying the movie and wants to
turn it off.
3. Jill selects a school project. After Jill buys supplies and works on it (1 month vs. 1
week), Jill discovers a better project that will take less time to complete.
4. George buys football tickets ($35 vs. $8). Later George’s favorite player is hurt, so he
doesn’t want to go to the game.
5. After a large meal, Paul buys a chocolate soufflé ($7.95 vs. $1.50). After a few bites he
finds he is too full to finish it.
6. Luis buys ballet tickets ($80 vs. $15). A week later, Luis is invited to a party at the
same time as the ballet. Luis would prefer to go to the party.
7. Nathan drives (4hrs vs. 30 min) to a state park for a hike. When Nathan arrives it has
turned cold and rainy. Nathan would not enjoy the planned hike and wants to go home.
8. Sonya joins the soccer team. After she buys soccer equipment and attends several
practices ($90 and 2 months vs. $25 and 1 week), Sonya decides she would rather play
softball.
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APPENDIX B: SUNK COST SCENARIOS FOR STUDY 2
Scenarios
1.

You decide, on the spur of the moment, to go to an all-you-can-eat buffet that costs

$7.99. After 15 minutes of eating one plate of food you realize that you are full. The
restaurant does not allow food to be carried out. What should you do?

2.

Carlos pays $250 for a non-refundable, non-transferable online dating subscription

and meets someone. After getting to know each other through the internet and phone
calls for 1 month, Carlos decides, after careful consideration, to meet his match in
person. They start to become intimate but neither one has a condom. What should
Carlos do?

3.

A month ago, Stephanie decided to purchase, on the spur of the moment, a 1 month

non-refundable, non-transferable bus pass for $25 because she used to live 15 miles
away from work. But now she lives 6 blocks away and could walk. What should
Stephanie do?

4.

During dinner at a restaurant, Ana decides, after careful consideration, to order a 44

oz alcoholic Margarita for $12.48. After a couple of sips, Ana realizes that the Margarita
has too much alcohol, which is making her dizzy. No one else on the table wants to share
it and Ana cannot return it. What should Ana do?

5.

You decide, on the spur of the moment, to buy a meal that consists of a

double-burger, fries and a shake for $8.75. You feel full after eating the burger. You don’t
feel like eating the fries and the shake but you cannot save them for later. What should
you do?

6.

At the beginning of the semester, you decided, after careful consideration, to

purchase a non-refundable, nontransferable school parking sticker for $75 because you
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used to live 30 miles away from school. But now you lives 6 blocks away from school and
could walk. What should you do?

7.

John is in a hurry and, on the spur of the moment, stops at a gas station on his way

home to buy a pack of cigarettes but the store is out of his favorite brand. John decides
to buy a different brand and pays $3.75. After smoking a couple of cigarettes, John
realizes they taste terrible but cannot get a refund nor does he knows anyone that would
take them. What should John do?

8.

You go to the bar, on the spur of the moment, and buy a pitcher of beer for $6.95.

You finish the beer and then decide to buy a second pitcher of beer for the same price.
But after a few sips you feel you had too much to drink. No one else wants to drink it.
What do you do?
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APPENDIX C: DECISION MAKING STYLES INVENTORY
(Nygren, 2000)
We are interested in how you typically go about making decisions. Think about different situations and
contexts where you have made decisions recently. Then for each statement below indicates the degree to
which you agree or disagree with that statement. Keep in mind that there are no right or wrong answers to
any of these items, because there is no single “best” way to make every decision. It is important that you try
to answer all questions. However, if you feel uncomfortable with any item, you may choose to omit it. Use
the following rating scale for each statement.

1

I feel that if I plan my decisions carefully I will make good
decisions.

2

In spontaneous decision situations I usually find that I
have good intuitions.

1
Disagree

3

I think that I could keep myself from worrying later if I had
made a bad decision.

4

In making decisions I first try to make a mental list of all
the factors or attributes that will be important to my
decision.
I can get a good “feeling” for most decision situations
very quickly.

1
Disagree
1

6
7

Before I make a decision, I like to figure out the most
efficient way of studying it.

8

I feel that I have a knack for making good, quick
decisions.

9

Before I make a decision, I think about whether others
will approve or disapprove of it.

10

I’m very rational when it comes to evaluating risky
options.

11

I think that relying on one’s “gut feelings” is a sound
decision making principle.

12

I tend to be someone who worries a lot over decisions
I’ve made.

13

In making decisions I first make a careful initial estimate
of the situation.

14

There are many common sense “rules-of-thumb” that I
know of that usually lead to good decisions.

1

Disagree
2
Disagree
2

Strongly Moderately
Disagree
1

Disagree
2

Strongly Moderately
1

Disagree
2

Strongly Moderately
Disagree
1

Disagree
2

Strongly Moderately
Disagree
1

Disagree
2

Strongly Moderately
Disagree
1

Disagree
2

Strongly Moderately
Disagree
1

Disagree
2

Strongly Moderately
Disagree
1

Disagree
2

Strongly Moderately
Disagree
1

Disagree
2

Strongly Moderately
Disagree
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2

Strongly Moderately

Disagree

I sometimes spend too much time hesitating before
making decisions.

Disagree

Strongly Moderately

Disagree

5

2

Strongly Moderately

1

Disagree
2

Strongly Moderately
Disagree
1

Disagree
2

Strongly Moderately
Disagree

Disagree

3
Slightly
Disagree
3
Slightly
Disagree
3
Slightly
Disagree
3
Slightly
Disagree
3
Slightly
Disagree
3
Slightly
Disagree
3
Slightly
Disagree
3
Slightly
Disagree
3
Slightly
Disagree
3
Slightly
Disagree
3
Slightly
Disagree
3
Slightly
Disagree
3
Slightly
Disagree
3
Slightly
Disagree

4
Slightly

5
Moderately

Disagree Disagree
4
Slightly

5

Slightly

5

Slightly

5

4

Slightly

5

5

Slightly

5

Slightly

5

Slightly

5

Slightly

5

Slightly

5

Slightly

5

Slightly

5

Slightly

6
Disagree
6
Disagree
6
Disagree
6
Disagree
6
Disagree
6
Disagree
6

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree
4

Disagree

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree
4

6

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree
4

Disagree

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree
4

6

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree
4

Disagree

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree
4

6

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree
4

Disagree

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree
4

6

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree
4

Disagree

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree

Slightly

6

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree
4

Disagree

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree
4

6
Strongly

5

Disagree
6

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree

Disagree

15

After making a decision, I find that I often go back and
re-evaluate the situation.

16

I try to pay attention to past information in making new
decisions.

17

Sometimes decisions, even important ones, are not
difficult to make because they just “feel” right.

18

I have trouble putting the results of disappointing
decisions I’ve made behind me.

1
Disagree
1

A good rule of thumb is that the more information I have
in making a decision, the better that decision will be.

20

Simple decision rules usually work best for me.

21

I rarely rethink old decisions I’ve made.

22

In making decisions I try to evaluate the importance of
each piece of information in the decision process.

23

When forced to make a quick decision; I find that
information that readily comes to mind is usually the
most useful in making a choice.
Worrying about future decisions that I have to make is
something I often do.

1
Disagree
1
Disagree
1

2
Disagree
2
Disagree
2

Strongly Moderately
1

Disagree
2

Strongly Moderately
1

Disagree
2

Strongly Moderately
Disagree
1

25

I always try to be fully prepared before I begin working on
making a decision.

26

My first reaction to a decision situation usually turns out
to be the best one.

27

Many times when I look back on a choice I’ve made, I
wish that I would have put more effort into evaluating the
alternatives.
In making decisions I try to examine the importance of
the good and bad points of each alternative.

1
Disagree
1
Disagree
1

30
31

I like to take a rational, systematic approach to making
decisions.

32

When making decisions, my first instinct usually turns out
to be best.

33

If I were gambling at a casino I would prefer to play
simpler games like slot machines where you don’t have
to concentrate on playing complex strategies.
My best decisions are those for which I’ve carefully
weighed all of the relevant information.

2
Disagree
2
Disagree
2

Strongly Moderately
1

Disagree
2

Strongly Moderately
1

Disagree
2

Strongly Moderately
Disagree
1

Disagree
2

Strongly Moderately
Disagree

When I find out that I’ve made a bad decision I feel a lot
of regret.

Disagree

Strongly Moderately

Disagree

If I can't decide what to do, I go with my "best guess".

2

Strongly Moderately

Disagree

29

Disagree

Strongly Moderately
Disagree

1

Disagree
2

Strongly Moderately
Disagree
1
Disagree
1

2
Disagree
2

Strongly Moderately
1

Disagree
2

Strongly Moderately
Disagree
1

Disagree
2

Strongly Moderately
Disagree
1

Disagree
2

Strongly Moderately
Disagree
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Disagree

Strongly Moderately

Disagree

34

Disagree

Strongly Moderately

Disagree

28

2

Strongly Moderately

Disagree

24

Disagree

Strongly Moderately
Disagree

19

2

Strongly Moderately

Disagree

3
Slightly
Disagree
3
Slightly
Disagree
3
Slightly
Disagree
3
Slightly
Disagree
3
Slightly
Disagree
3
Slightly
Disagree
3
Slightly
Disagree
3
Slightly
Disagree
3
Slightly
Disagree
3
Slightly
Disagree
3
Slightly
Disagree
3
Slightly
Disagree
3
Slightly
Disagree
3
Slightly
Disagree
3
Slightly
Disagree
3
Slightly
Disagree
3
Slightly
Disagree
3
Slightly
Disagree
3
Slightly
Disagree
3
Slightly
Disagree

4
Slightly

5

Disagree Disagree
4
Slightly

5

Slightly

5

Slightly

5

Slightly

5
Moderately

Disagree Disagree
4
Slightly

5
Moderately

Disagree Disagree
4
Slightly

5

Slightly

5

Slightly

5

4

Slightly

5

5

Slightly

5

Slightly

5

4

Slightly

5

5

Slightly

5

Slightly

5

Slightly

5

Slightly

5

4

6
Disagree
6
Disagree
6
Disagree
6
Disagree
6
Disagree
6
Disagree
6
Disagree
6
Disagree
6
Disagree
6
Disagree
6

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree

Slightly

Disagree

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree
4

6

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree
4

Disagree

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree
4

6

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree
4

Disagree

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree
4

6
Strongly

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree

Slightly

Disagree

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree
4

6
Strongly

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree
4

Disagree

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree
4

6

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree

Slightly

Disagree

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree
4

6

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree
4

Disagree

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree
4

6

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree
4

Disagree

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree
4

6

Moderately Strongly

5

Disagree
6

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree

Disagree

35

I let my intuition play a big part in most decisions I make.

36

I generally don’t make very good decisions under time
pressure.

37

I generally rely on careful reasoning in making up my
mind.

38

I often rely on my first impression when making a
decision.

1
Disagree

39

I sometimes get “butterflies” in my stomach when I have
to make decisions.

40

I like to make decisions in an orderly manner.

41

I rely on my intuition in making many of my personal
decisions.

42

After making a decision I sometimes worry about the
regret I’ll feel if it the outcome turns out to be a bad one.

43

Most important decisions in life are complex and need to
be evaluated in a systematic way.

44

I find that my best decisions usually result from using the
“quick and easy” approach rather than the “slow but
sure” method.
Unexpected bad outcomes have a greater impact on me
than do unexpected good outcomes.

Disagree

1

3
Slightly
Disagree

2

3

Strongly Moderately
Disagree

Disagree

1

Slightly
Disagree

2

3

Strongly Moderately
Disagree

Disagree

1

Slightly
Disagree

2

3

Strongly Moderately
Disagree

Disagree

1

Slightly
Disagree

2

3

Strongly Moderately
Disagree

Disagree

1

Slightly
Disagree

2

3

Strongly Moderately
Disagree

Disagree

1

Slightly
Disagree

2

3

Strongly Moderately
Disagree

Disagree

1

Slightly
Disagree

2

3

Strongly Moderately
Disagree

45

2

Strongly Moderately

Disagree

1

Slightly
Disagree

2

3

Strongly Moderately
Disagree

Disagree

1

Slightly
Disagree

2

3

Strongly Moderately
Disagree

Disagree

1

Slightly
Disagree

2

3

Strongly Moderately
Disagree

Disagree

Slightly
Disagree

Scoring instructions: Reverse code item 3, 21
Add the following items for each factor:
a) Analytical: 1, 4, 7, 10, 13, 16, 19, 22, 25, 28, 31, 34, 37, 40, 43;
b) Intuitive: 2 5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 23, 26, 29, 32, 35, 38, 41, 44;
c) Regret: 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24, 27, 30, 33, 36, 39, 42, 45
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4
Slightly

5

Disagree Disagree
4
Slightly

5

Slightly

5

Slightly

5

Slightly

5

Slightly

5

Slightly

5

Slightly

5

Slightly

5

Slightly

5

4

Disagree
6
Disagree
6
Disagree
6
Disagree
6
Disagree
6

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree

Slightly

6

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree
4

Disagree

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree
4

6

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree
4

Disagree

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree
4

6

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree
4

Disagree

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree
4

6

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree
4

Disagree

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree
4

6

Moderately Strongly

5

Disagree
6

Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree

Disagree

APPENDIX D: ACCULTURATION MEASURE
Marin et al (1987)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Usually what language or languages do you
read and speak?
What language or languages did you use
when you were a child?
What language or languages do you usually
speak at home now?
What language or languages do you usually
use when you think?
What language or languages do you usually
use with your friends?
What language or languages are most TV
shows that you watch?
What language or languages are most radio
stations that you listen to?
What language or languages do you prefer
for movies, TV shows and radio programs?

1
Only
Spanish

Spanish

10 You prefer parties and social gatherings
where the people are:
11 People you visit and who visit you are:
12 If you could choose friends for your children
you would choose:

Language use and ethnic loyalty: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
Media: 6, 7, 8
Ethnic Social Relations: 9, 10, 11, 12
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than English

Equally

2

Spanish

Both

than English

Equally

2

Spanish

Both

than English

Equally

2

Spanish

Both

than English

Equally

2

Spanish

Both

than English

Equally

2

Spanish

Both

than English

Equally

2

Spanish

3

Spanish more

Both

than English

Equally

1
Only

3

Spanish more

1
Only

3

Spanish more

1
Only

3

Spanish more

1
Only

3

Spanish more

1
Only

3

Spanish more

1
Only

3
Both

1
Only

1

Your close friends are:

2
Spanish more

2

3

Spanish more

Both

than English

Equally

4

5

English more

Only

than Spanish

English

4

5

English more

Only

than Spanish

English

4

5

English more

Only

than Spanish

English

4

5

English more

Only

than Spanish

English

4

5

English more

Only

than Spanish

English

4

5

English more

Only

than Spanish

English

4

5

English more

Only

than Spanish

English

4

5

English more

Only

than Spanish

English

2

3

4

5

All

Mostly

Equally Hispanics

Mostly

All

Hispanic

Hispanic

and Anglos

Anglos

Anglos

2

3

4

5

All

Mostly

Equally Hispanics

Mostly

All

Hispanic

Hispanic

and Anglos

Anglos

Anglos

1

2

3

4

5

All

1

Mostly

Equally Hispanics

Mostly

All

Hispanic

Hispanic

and Anglos

Anglos

Anglos

2

3

4

5

All

Mostly

Equally Hispanics

Mostly

All

Hispanic

Hispanic

and Anglos

Anglos

Anglos

1

APPENDIX E: MULTIDIMENSIONAL FATALISM MEASURE
(Esparza & Wiebe, 2008)
Directions: Please answer the following questions based on what you think. Rate how strongly you agree
or disagree with each statement.

Make sure to answer every question. Remember that there is no right

or wrong answers.
1

I have learned that what is going to happen will happen.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly

Disagree

2

I feel that nothing I can do will change things.

Agree

Disagree

3

I feel that when good things happen, they happen as a result of
my own efforts.

Agree

Disagree

4

When I get what I want, it's usually because I'm lucky.

Agree

Disagree

5

Everything that happens is part of God's plan.

Agree

Disagree

6

If something bad is going to happen to me, it will happen no
matter what I do.

Agree

Disagree

7

Sometimes I feel there is nothing to look forward to in the future.

Agree

Disagree

8

What happens to me in the future mostly depends on me.

Agree

Disagree

9

How successful people are in their job is related to how lucky
they are.

Agree

Disagree

10

Everything that happens to a person was planned by God.

Agree

Disagree

11

If bad things happen, it is because they were meant to happen.

Agree

Disagree

12

I feel that I do not have any control over the things that happen
to me.

Agree

Disagree

13

My life is determined by my own actions.

Agree

Disagree

14

Some people are simply born being lucky.

Agree

Disagree

15

Whatever happens to me in my life, it is because that is the way
God wanted it to happen.

Agree

Disagree

16

There is no sense in planning a lot; if something good is going to
happen, it will.

Agree

Disagree

17

No matter how hard I try, I still cannot succeed in life.

Disagree
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Agree

Agree

18

What people get out of life is always due to the amount of effort
they put into it.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly

Disagree

19

When good things happen to people, it is because of good luck.

Agree

Disagree

20
21
22

God controls everything good and bad that happens to a
person.
Life is very unpredictable, and there is nothing one can do to
change the future.
I often feel overwhelmed with problems, since I do not have any
control over solving these problems.

Agree

Disagree

Agree

Disagree

Agree

Disagree

23

What happens to me is a consequence of what I do.

Agree

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly

Disagree

24

The really good things that happen to me are mostly because of
luck.

Agree

Disagree

25

God has a plan for each person, and you cannot change his
plan.

Agree

Disagree

26
27
28

People die when it is their time to die and there is not much that
can be done about it.
There's nothing I can do to succeed in life, since one's level of
success is determined when one is born.
I can do almost anything if I really want to do it.

Agree

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly

Disagree

Agree

Disagree

Agree

Disagree

29

Luck does not exist

Agree

Disagree

30

No matter how much effort I invest into doing things, at the end,
God's decisions will prevail.

Disagree

Scoring instructions:
1. Reverse code item 24
2. Add the following items for each factor
a. Ineluctable Destiny: 1, 6, 11, 16, 21, 26
b. Helplessness: 2, 7, 12, 17, 22, 27
c.

Internality: 3, 8, 13, 18, 23, 28

d. Luck: 4, 9, 14, 19, 24, 29
e. Divine Control: 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30
Validated Spanish-language (Mexican) available from the authors, on request:
Dr. Oscar A. Esparza: oscaresparza007@yahoo.com
Dr. John Wiebe: jwiebe@utep.edu
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Agree

Agree

APPENDIX F: RATINGS FOR PILOT STUDY SCENARIOS

Criteria
Plausible

Relevant

Clear

Realistic

Similar

N (%)

N (%)

N (%)

N (%)

N (%)

Scenario 1

79 (98.8)

78 (97.5)

79 (98.8)

79 (98.8)

78 (97.5)

Scenario 2

78 (97.5)

79 (98.8)

78 (97.5)

79 (98.8)

77 (96.3)

Scenario 3

60 (75)

71 (88.8)

68 (85)

62 (77.5)

54 (67.5)

Scenario 4

60 (75)

70 (87.5)

71 (88.8)

65 (81.3)

52 (65)

Scenario 5

71 (88.8)

77 (96.3)

69 (86.3)

67 (83.8)

69 (86.3)

Scenario 6

78 (97.5)

79 (98.8)

71 (88.8)

65 (81.3)

71 (88.8)

Scenario 7

52 (65)

63 (78.8)

45 (56.3)

39 (48.8)

22 (27.5)

Scenario 8

54 (67.5)

54 (67.5)

50 (62.5)

15 (18.8)

13 (16.3)

Scenario 9

65 (81.3)

71 (88.8)

69 (86.3)

45 (56.3)

15 (18.8)

Scenario 10

47 (58.8)

70 (87.5)

15 (18.8)

32 (40)

62 (77.5)

Scenario 11

7 (8.8)

22 (27.5)

32 (40)

5 (6.3)

8 (10)

Scenario 12

25 (31.3)

70 (87.5)

18 (22.5)

13 (16.30

18 (22.5)

Scenario 13

31 (38.8)

54 (67.5)

51 (63.8)

27 (33.8)

5 (6.3)

Scenario 14

47 (58.8)

63 (78.8)

50 (62.5)

24 (30)

7 (8.8)

Scenario 15

70 (87.5)

79 (98.8)

65 (81.3)

62 (77.5)

25 (31.3)

Scenario 16

56 (70)

53 (66.3)

54 (67.5)

36 (45)

32 (40)

Scenario 17

60 (75)

79 (98.8)

60 (75)

62 (77.5)

32 (40)

Scenario 18

69 (86.3)

79 (98.8)

67 (83.8)

62 (77.5)

65 (81.3)

Scenario 19

36 (45)

71 (88.8)

54 (67.5)

45 (56.3)

54 (67.5)

Scenario 20

66 (82.5)

71 (88.8)

68 (85)

53 (66.3)

66 (82.5)

Eating habits

Exercise

Safe Sex

Smoking

Drinking

Note. Participants were asked to either agree or disagree with each criteria. % indicates the number of
participants that agreed with that criteria.

109

VITA
Norma “Patti” Fernandez earned her Bachelor of Science degree in Education
from Martin Luther College in 1997. She worked for Publications for Latin America as the
Editor-Translator in chief of Spanish materials, coordinating various translators. In 2006,
she obtained her Master of Arts degree in Applied Experimental Psychology at the
University of Texas at El Paso and her Master in Public Health from the University of
Texas Health Science Center at Houston, School of Public Health in 2008.
Patti is an Alliance for Graduate Education and the Professoriate scholar. She was
supervised by Dr. Osvaldo F. Morera during her doctoral studies. Patti has obtained grant
funding from the Hispanic and Health Disparities Research Center and the National
Science Foundation (“East Asia Summer Institutes for US Graduate Students”). These
grants accorded her with the educational opportunity of fulfilling and conducting the duties
of principal investigator for the first time, while supervised by accomplished scientists.
While pursuing her graduate degrees, Patti worked as a research assistant for the
departments of Psychology, Public Health, Education, and Nursing. In addition, she was
afforded the opportunity to teach and mentor students as an instructor as well as the
Judgment and Decision Making laboratory manager for several semesters. She interned
at the World Health Organization in Geneva, Switzerland in 2006 with the Tobacco Free
Initiative program and at the National Chung Cheng University in Chia-Yi, Taiwan in 2007.
Patti wants to continue pursuing research related to the development of prevention
and intervention health programs that help reduce health disparities among minorities
with an additional focus on research related to the study of how people make decisions
regarding health issues. Additionally, she wants to continue pursuing her passion for
teaching and mentoring students.
Permanent address:

11440 Lake Erie
El Paso TX 79936
110

